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The Concealed Cost of Convenience:
Protecting Personal Data Privacy in the
Age of Alexa
Lauren Bass*
In today’s interconnected, internet-dependent, global information economy, consumers willingly, but often unwittingly, divulge
to tech companies their personal and private data—frequently with
little regard for its safekeeping or intended future use.
Enter Alexa, Amazon’s voice-activated, natural-language
processing digital smart assistant. A sophisticated artificial intelligence (“AI”), Alexa insinuates itself into a user’s personal sphere,
learns from and adapts to the surrounding environment, siphons
personal information and data, and ultimately produces for the user
a perfectly tailored, concierge experience. Convenience is the product. Data privacy is the cost.
Over one half of American consumers own an Alexa-enabled
device or other AI-powered digital smart assistant. This rapid adoption of AI technology has created the potential for an untenable and
unsustainable surveillance state in which private data brokers such
as Amazon can control the flow of information and hold hostage the
individual consumer.
The existing U.S. legal framework—a sectoral regime heavily
dependent upon the principals of “Notice and Choice,” under
the ineffectual oversight of the Federal Trade Commission—is illequipped to deal with the privacy issues presented by the AI-based
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data collection of smart assistants. The time for comprehensive
federal data privacy reform is now. The states should not shoulder
this burden. Instead, Congress must act to establish a uniform
system of rules that will federally regulate the collection and
retention practices of data brokers and safeguard the autonomy and
data privacy of the individual.
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INTRODUCTION
Home Surveillance—the term conjures images of conspicuously
placed cameras along the perimeter of one’s domicile, judiciously
employed for security purposes to monitor and prevent access from
outside intruders or bad actors. Today, however, the term home
surveillance more aptly describes the technology employed inside a
modern “smart” home.1 Marketed as a gadget of convenience, the
voice-enabled smart assistant—a recent addition to the Internet of
Things (“IoT”)2—purports to aid daily life, automating simple and
mundane tasks such as regulating the thermostat3 or ordering a
pizza.4 Beneath the sleek futuristic exterior, however, a smart
1

See Anick Jesdanun, Advances in Smart Home Tech Raise Privacy Concerns, CLAIMS
J. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2019/01/08/288630.htm
[https://perma.cc/78LS-YCM5] (quoting Jeff Chester, executive director for the Center for
Digital Democracy, as saying, “It’s decentralized surveillance . . . . We’re living in a world
where we’re tethered to some online service stealthily gathering our information.”).
2
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) refers to “the network of physical objects that contain
embedded technology to communicate and sense or interact with their internal states or the
external environment.” See Internet of Things, GARTNER.COM: IT GLOSSARY,
https://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/internet-of-things [https://perma.cc/6EQ3-AG4D].
For a more detailed explanation of the history and evolution of IoT, see Knud Lasse Luth,
Why the Internet of Things Is Called Internet of Things: Definition, History,
Disambiguation, IOT ANALYTICS (Dec. 19, 2014), https://iot-analytics.com/internet-ofthings-definition/ [https://perma.cc/8LY9-9DYV]. This Note focuses solely on Alexaenabled AI digital assistants, a small subsection of IoT.
3
See, e.g., Nest Learning Thermostat Overview, NEST, https://nest.com/thermostats/
nest-learning-thermostat/overview/ [https://perma.cc/UAW3-TBGF].
4
See Eugene Kim, The Inside Story of How Amazon Created Echo, the Next BillionDollar Business No One Saw Coming, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 2, 2016, 12:01 PM),
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assistant is little more than surveillance equipment—cameras,
microphones, and AI learning centers—embedded into the home
under the guise of “the next big thing in computing.”5 This new form
of constant surveillance no longer aims to keep out, but rather
to draw in—engaging and ensnaring consumers into allowing
the mavericks of Silicon Valley to indiscriminately collect, mine,
store, and analyze endless amounts of data willingly offered by their
subjects, all under the façade of convenience.6
This rapid adoption of AI technology, substantially in the form
of voice-enabled smart assistants like Amazon’s Alexa, has created
the potential for a monopolistic surveillance state in which Amazon
and other private data brokers dominate, controlling the flow
of information, wielding immense market power, and essentially
holding the individual consumer hostage.7 Afraid of stifling innovation and dampening the progress of capitalism,8 Congress, to date,
has maintained an arms-length approach to regulating both Silicon
Valley and its Big Data practices. However, as AI voice-technology
continues to infiltrate and embed itself into the daily fabric, the
prevailing U.S. legal framework—a sectoral regime heavily reliant
upon the fair information principles of Notice and Choice9 coupled
with limited Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) oversight—is illequipped to efficiently or effectively regulate the predatory privacy

https://www.businessinsider.com/the-inside-story-of-how-amazon-created-echo-2016-4
[https://perma.cc/Y2T3-ESNX].
5
Elad Natanson, Artificial Intelligence Smart Assistants: The Next Big Thing in
Computing?, FORBES (June 22, 2017, 7:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elad
natanson/2017/06/22/artificial-intelligence-smart-assistants-the-next-big-thing-incomputing/#19d371534252 [https://perma.cc/A9U6-HV8A].
6
See Jesdanun, supra note 1; see also John Paul Titlow, Smart Homes: Our Next
Digital Privacy Nightmare, READWRITE (Mar. 18, 2013), https://readwrite.com/
2013/03/18/smart-homes-our-next-digital-privacy-nightmare/
[https://perma.cc/P5N45FDW].
7
See Katharine Schwab, Amazon Could Soon Force You to Go on a Diet, According to
One Futurist, FAST CO. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90322180/
amazon-could-soon-force-you-to-go-on-a-diet-according-to-one-futurist
[https://perma.cc/7SPT-46AK].
8
See Omar Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big
Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63 (2012) (warning that a “regulatory backlash”
could dampen the data economy and stifle innovation).
9
See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE 80–83 (2018).
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procedures of data-hungry tech companies, leaving consumers prey
to abuses and violations in the collection, storage, and manipulation
of their personal information.10
This Note argues that the time for comprehensive federal
legislative privacy reform of the tech sector and its voracious data
consumption practice is now. Using Amazon’s voice-enabled AI,
Alexa, as an illustrative example, this Note identifies key data
privacy11 issues raised by the rapid expansion and embrace of voiceenabled smart assistants, interrogates the effectiveness of the current
legal privacy paradigms in protecting consumer privacy, and
10

For the purposes of this Note, “personal information” will encapsulate both personally
identifiable information (“PII”) (see definition below) and non-PII, as advances in
de-anonymization techniques have blurred the lines such that even non-PII may be easily
used to identify an individual. See Kelsey Campbell-Dollaghan, Sorry, Your Data Can Still
Be Identified Even If It’s Anonymized, FAST COMPANY (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.fast
company.com/90278465/sorry-your-data-can-still-be-identified-even-its-anonymized
[https://perma.cc/ZT53-7VNX]. PII is defined as:
[A]ny information about an individual . . . including (1) any
information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s
identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth,
mother’s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other
information that is linked or linkable to an individual . . . .
ERIKA MCCALLISTER, TIM GRANCE & KAREN SCARFONE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., SPECIAL PUB. 800–122, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) 2–1 (Apr. 2010) (quoting U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-536, PRIVACY: ALTERNATIVES EXIST FOR ENHANCING
PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 1 n.1 (2008). The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) explains:
To distinguish an individual is to identify that individual . . . . To trace
an individual is to process sufficient information to make a
determination about a specific aspect of an individual’s activities or
status . . . . Linked information is information about or related to an
individual that is logically associated with other information about the
individual. In contrast, linkable information is information about or
related to an individual for which there is a possibility of logical
association with other information about the individual.
Id.
11
Data privacy, also synonymous with “informational privacy,” is defined as “the ability
to determine for yourself when and how others may collect and use your information.”
Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice and Choice: Privacy, Norms and
Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370, 373 (2014). Note that data privacy differs from data
protection, which deals with the securing of one’s data against unauthorized access. The
former is a legal issue, while the latter a technical one. See Rick Robinson, Data Privacy
vs. Data Protection, IPSWITCH (Jan. 29, 2018), https://blog.ipswitch.com/data-privacy-vsdata-protection [https://perma.cc/5LPY-KMH6].
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investigates potential solutions for the future. Part I examines the
history and conception of personal privacy in Anglo-American law,
as well as the threats posed by the expansion of AI and Big Data as
embodied by Amazon’s virtual smart assistant, Alexa. Part II
exposes the fundamental differences between the privacy models
implemented by the United States and the European Union (“EU”),
explains the origins of the existing U.S. privacy paradigm, and
queries that paradigm’s ability to adequately regulate the private
sector or protect individuals from privacy threats posed by rapidly
advancing and unregulated AI technology. Part III explores the ways
in which the law permits widespread unchecked collection of
personal data by AI smart assistants and analyzes the limitations that
the current operating framework presents. Part IV eyes the future
and proposes reforms to the existing data privacy regime.
I. OVERVIEW
A. Anglo-American Conceptions of Privacy
The concepts of privacy and the protection of the individual
against outside intrusive forces are fundamental tenets underlying
much of Anglo-American jurisprudence.12 The doctrines permeate
property and tort law, under which the right to exclude has become
one of the “most essential sticks” in an individual’s “bundle of
rights.”13 The principles are embedded in the U.S. Constitution in
the First Amendment (which protects the privacy of one’s personal
beliefs),14 the Third Amendment (which prohibits the mandatory
quartering of soldiers in one’s home),15 the Fourth Amendment
(which secures a “right of the people” against unwarranted and
violative government intrusion upon “persons,” “houses” and

12
For a more detailed explanation of the origin of the maxim and its impact on AngloAmerican law, see Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on
the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175 (2002).
13
See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274, 283 (2002).
14
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15
See id. amend. III.
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“effects”),16 and the Fifth Amendment (which protects personal information and privacy by proscribing self-incrimination).17 Eleven
state constitutions echo the federal provisions and provide even
further explicit protections for individuals and their privacy rights.18
Although the courts have stopped short of specifically defining that
one is entitled to a “right to privacy,” they have repeatedly employed
the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to recognize and protect an
intrinsic interest in individual autonomy, which has helped to shield
minors from the detriments of indecent speech,19 permit adult
possession of pornography,20 and safeguard couples’ sovereignty
within the bedroom.21
In the late nineteenth century, following the advent of the
instantaneous camera and portable audio recording devices, both of
which had the potential to readily breach individual privacy as well

16
See id. amend. IV. Although helpful here as an illustrative example, in general, the
Fourth Amendment and its protections of privacy fall outside the scope of this Note.
17
See id. amend. V.
18
See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (“No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1
(“All people . . . have inalienable rights. Among these are . . . privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of
private communications by any means, shall not be violated.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6–
7 (“The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest.”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The people shall have
the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications
by eavesdropping devices or other means.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be
secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”); MONT. CONST. art. II § 10
(“The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”); N.H. CONST. pt. 1,
art. 2-b (“An individual’s right to live free from governmental intrusion in private or
personal information is natural, essential, and inherent.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be
violated . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”).
19
See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 (1978).
20
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
21
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
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as the sanctity of the home,22 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
penned their seminal treatise,23 which introduced the common law
principle of an individual’s right “to be let alone.”24 Drawing on
the doctrine of property—specifically that of exclusion25—this
inherent privacy right aimed to safeguard one’s human dignity and
individuality,26 or, as Warren and Brandeis termed it, the “inviolate
personality.”27 According to their theory, an individual possesses
exclusive control over his “thoughts, sentiments, and emotions,”
or, in other words, his personal and private data.28 Such “possessions,” argued Warren and Brandeis, could not (and should not) be
appropriated (or misappropriated) by another without the
individual’s express consent.29
Warren and Brandeis loathed the idea that the gossip journalists’
cameras and recording machines could intrude in any way upon their
seclusion.30 These “mechanical devices,” they warned, “threaten to
make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall
be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”31 To counteract any such
unsanctioned invasion of privacy, Warren and Brandeis contended,
the injurious violation of privacy by technology—the surreptitious
taking of photographs or audio recordings—must be recognized
as legally cognizable harms,32 which could be identified and
subsequently remedied in common-law tort proceedings.33

22

See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 16.
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
24
Id. at 195. While commonly attributed to Warren and Brandeis, Thomas M. Cooley
originally coined the phrase, the right “to be let alone” a decade earlier in his 1879 treatise.
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (1879).
25
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 216.
26
Edward Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 991 (1964).
27
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205, 211.
28
Id. at 198.
29
See id.
30
See id. at 195, 206; see also Robert Grace, Warren & Brandeis: The Right to Curate
an Identity, PHOTOBOX GROUP SECURITY BLOG (Dec. 4, 2017), https://pbx-group-security.
com/blog/2017/12/04/the-right-to-curate-an-identity/ [https://perma.cc/TZC8-4BYT].
31
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195.
32
See id. at 206.
33
See id. at 211.
23
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Warren and Brandeis’s “natural right” proved influential upon
the courts34 and state legislatures.35 However, it was the codification
of their principals within tort law by William Prosser that solidified
those theories as the dominant Anglo-American approach to privacy.36 In the late 1960s, Prosser surveyed the litigation landscape
and identified four civil rights of action under which to classify
privacy tort suits: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure
of private facts; (3) publicity placing one in a false light; and (4)
appropriation of one’s likeness for the advantage of another.37 Born
as they were out of Warren and Brandeis’s philosophies, Prosser’s
torts naturally borrowed from the same underlying principles. Each
tort invoked the doctrines and language of trespass, exclusion, and
theft, and framed the legal harm as one of unauthorized access: a
right of the individual to protect his person and his home by keeping
others out.38
Scholars have argued that Prosser’s contextualization of a
privacy doctrine within the consolidated torts has been a “mixed”
blessing.39 On the one hand, it has provided courts with a clear
categorization for inflicted harm.40 On the other, it has stunted the
growth and evolution of privacy law by allowing courts to rely
solely on an artificial taxonomy rather than on a broad and malleable
conceptualization.41 As Professors Neil M. Richards and Daniel J.
Solove contend, “[b]efore Prosser, courts looked to Warren and
Brandeis’s article and examined whether particular harms fell under
the very broad principle of the ‘right to be let alone.’ After Prosser,
courts looked to whether a particular harm fit into one of Prosser’s
four categories.”42 The privacy harms threatening individuals
today—namely Silicon Valley’s unregulated collection, storage and
manipulation of personal data via new technology such as AI smart
34

See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73–74 (Ga. 1905).
See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2019).
36
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–D (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
37
See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
38
See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 95.
39
See generally Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed
Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010).
40
See id. at 1915 (arguing that “[a]fter Prosser, courts looked to whether a particular
harm fit into one of Prosser’s four categories”).
41
See id.
42
Id.
35
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assistants—cannot be accurately confined to or remedied by
Prosser’s torts. Instead they require a broader conceptualization that
can adjust to the changing technological landscape and the emerging
harms. As a result, privacy torts have failed as a viable solution to
privacy threats facing Americans today.
Privacy is also inherently normative. Therefore, social, economic, and even religious concerns have further influenced and
shaped Anglo-American conceptions and perceptions of privacy.
Take, for example, the biblical parable of the Garden of Eden. When
coaxed by the serpent, Eve finally eats the apple from the Tree of
Knowledge.43 Upon acquiring “knowledge,” she immediately has an
innate sense that her “privacy” is being invaded by Adam’s gaze, so
she protects her right to privacy with a well-placed fig leaf.44
Today’s fig leaves take the forms of walls, doors, window dressings,
and security surveillance systems. These physical barriers express
an intrinsic sense of liberty and property—a need to protect one’s
interests in person and possessions. We exclude that which we fear;
we include that which we trust.
A man’s home is his castle, and he protects it as such.45 When
threats to the home manifest as physical intrusions, they are easy
to identify and ward off. But what happens when the privacy
veil of the home is pierced, and the evil that one has previously
endeavored to exclude becomes that which one is now eager and
willing to include?
B. Amazon’s AI, Alexa
Enter Alexa, Amazon’s voice-enabled, natural-language
processing, digital AI assistant.46 First introduced in 2014, Alexa is
43

See Genesis 3:6.
See id.
45
“That the house of every one [sic] is to him as his Castle . . . domus sua cuique est
tutissimum refugium.” SIR EDWARD COKE, SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE,
VOL. 1, at 137 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). See also Gary Martin, The Meaning and Origin
of the Expression: An Englishman’s Home Is His Castle, PHRASE FINDER,
https://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/an-englishmans-home-is-his-castle.html
[https://perma.cc/W8ES-L2FC].
46
See Megan Trout, Amazon—A Winning Strategy Continues with Alexa, HARV. BUS.
SCH.: DIGITAL INITIATIVE (Feb. 1, 2017), https://digit.hbs.org/submission/amazon-awinning-strategy-continues-with-alexa/ [https://perma.cc/LJ4N-PGY5].
44
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the central nervous system and brain that powers Echo, Amazon’s
sleek smart speaker.47 Originally offered as a hands-free means by
which to control one’s music collection,48 today’s Alexa has evolved
from a simple DJ49 to a ubiquitous and trusted household presence
tasked with the responsibility of unlocking the front door,50 turning
on the lights,51 regulating the thermostat,52 ordering dinner,53
assisting the kids with their homework,54 cleaning the house,55
and, at the end of a long day, even helping one to drift off into a
quiet slumber.56
Although colloquially, the terms Echo and Alexa are often used
interchangeably, they actually represent two very different entities
within the larger Amazon ecosystem. The former refers to the
47

See Christina Bonnington, Amazon Alexa Is the Home Assistant You Never Knew You
Needed, DAILY DOT (Mar. 4, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/amazonalexa/ [https://perma.cc/CGF2-VXMF].
48
See Matt Weinberger, How Amazon’s Echo Went from a Smart-Speaker to the Center
of Your Home, BUS. INSIDER (May 23, 2017, 6:08 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
amazon-echo-and-alexa-history-from-speaker-to-smart-home-hub-2017-5
[https://perma.cc/63ZS-KBYD].
49
See Dan Moren, How to Play Amazon Music Using Alexa, TOM’S GUIDE (Nov. 28,
2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.tomsguide.com/us/alexa-amazon-music,review-4512.html
[https://perma.cc/5X2X-D3LK].
50
See Leena Rao, Amazon’s Alexa Now Can Lock Your Front Door, FORBES (July 28,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/28/alexa-amazon-august-smart-lock/ [https://perma.cc/
BLT3-22SJ]; see also Control Your August Smart Lock with Amazon Alexa, AUGUST,
https://www.august.com/pages/alexa [https://perma.cc/ A786-9DF5].
51
See Lori Gil, How to Control Your Lights with Amazon Echo, IMORE (Nov. 13, 2018),
https://www.imore.com/how-control-your-lights-amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/Q2H9RU88].
52
See Jason Fitzpatrick, How to Control Your Nest Learning Thermostat with Alexa,
HOW-TO GEEK (June 20, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/247553/how-tocontrol-your-nest-learning-thermostat-with-alexa/ [https://perma.cc/ETB8-MV2C].
53
See Chelsea Stone, Amazon Alexa Can Now Help You Order Takeout, SELF (Jan. 5,
2017), https://www.self.com/story/amazon-alexa-now-orders-takeout [https://perma.cc/
2EHR-L2CZ].
54
See Tyler Lacoma, 6 Ways Alexa Can Help Kids with Their Homework, DIGITAL
TRENDS (Feb. 26, 2019, 1:33 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/6-ways-alexacan-help-kids-with-their-homework/ [https://perma.cc/NGP2-C7DK].
55
See Alina Bradford, How Alexa Can Help You Clean Your House, CNET (Apr. 24,
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/how-to-clean-your-house-with-alexa/
[https://perma.cc/3X79-DPWY].
56
See Victoria Hoff, How I Hacked My Amazon Echo to Help Me Sleep Better, BYRDIE
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.byrdie.com/amazon-echo-sleep-tips [https://perma.cc/T2W6TQQL].
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physical hardware that consumers purchase—the smart speaker that
sits atop a counter in the kitchen or a nightstand in the bedroom and
functions as a portal to Amazon’s remote cloud servers.57 The latter
refers to the disembodied voice that represents the human-AI
interaction—an aural personification of the complex neural
network58 that engages each time a user interacts with Amazon’s
intricate AI technology.59
Amazon actively markets its line of Alexa-enabled devices as
“your family’s friend”60—technology designed to make “life easier”
and “more fun.”61 Beneath the attractive Madison Avenue sales
pitch, however, Alexa, as embodied in the Echo, is a Trojan horse—
an intelligent surveillance and data collection system earning
entrance into personal spaces such as the home or office under the
guise of “next gen” concierge tech.62 Equipped with microphones,
digital cameras, computer learning centers, an unquenchable thirst
for consumer data, and the infinite capacity to store collected
information in the cloud,63 these AI-powered smart-home assistants
gain unfettered access to the most private areas of a user’s life, both
physically—stationed in the living room, the kitchen, the dining

57
See Marie Black, What Is Amazon Echo? A Complete Guide, TECH ADVISOR (June 10,
2019), https://www.techadvisor.co.uk/news/audio/amazon-echo-3584881/ [https://perma.
cc/36LL-DRBS].
58
“A neural network is a type of machine learning which models itself after the human
brain. This creates an artificial neural network that via an algorithm allows the computer
to learn by incorporating new data . . . termed deep learning.” Jonas DeMuro, What Is a
Neural Network?, TECHRADAR (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.techradar.com/news/whatis-a-neural-network [https://perma.cc/9BLD-U7QH].
59
Kate Crawford & Vladan Joler, Anatomy of an AI System: The Amazon Echo as an
Anatomical Map of Human Labor, Data, and Planetary Resources, AI NOW INST. & SHARE
LAB (Sept. 7, 2018), https://anatomyof.ai/ [https://perma.cc/3HM5-NB4C].
60
Chris Davies, How Private Is Amazon Echo?, SLASH GEAR (Nov. 7, 2014, 11:22 AM),
https://www.slashgear.com/how-private-is-amazon-echo-07354486/
[https://perma.cc/Q4E6-569F].
61
Alexa User Guide: Learn What Alexa Can Do, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2RkP9DA
[https://perma.cc/TU5F-4R6S].
62
Shashank M, Rise of the Smart Home Assistants, MEDIUM (May 31, 2018),
https://medium.com/@shanky101/rise-of-the-smart-home-assistants-e3fb7d3a9f58
[https://perma.cc/29AD-3ELM].
63
See Kim Wetzel, What Is Alexa, and What Can Amazon’s Virtual Assistant Do for
You?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 16, 2019, 7:25 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/home/
what-is-amazons-alexa-and-what-can-it-do [https://perma.cc/S5PL-HWAD].
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room and even the bedroom64—and emotionally, as users willingly
divulge personal and often confidential information.
Once inside a user’s private sphere, Alexa remains ever vigilant
and always listening.65 Like Beyoncé, Alexa simply asks that you
say her name66 to call her to action.67 Her functionality, however, is
not self-contained within the hardware; Alexa and her intelligence
exist wholly on Amazon’s cloud servers. Therefore, all requests are
recorded and transmitted to Amazon for processing.68 To accomplish this, Alexa remains constantly tethered to the internet to allow

64

See Tom Warren, Amazon’s Echo Spot Is a Sneaky Way to Get a Camera into Your
Bedroom, VERGE (Sept. 28, 2017, 10:02 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/9/28/
16378472/amazons-echo-spot-camera-in-your-bedroom [https://perma.cc/2M4B-7QSZ].
65
See Jenna Wortham, How Alexa Fits into Amazon Prime’s Directive, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/magazine/how-alexa-fitsinto-amazons-prime-directive.html [https://perma.cc/VUQ3-ZE4U].
66
See DESTINY’S CHILD, Say My Name, on THE WRITING’S ON THE WALL (Columbia
Records 1999).
67
See Grant Clauser, What Is Alexa? What is the Amazon Echo, and Should You Get
One?, WIRECUTTER (Jan. 29, 2019), https://thewirecutter.com/reviews/what-is-alexawhat-is-the-amazon-echo-and-should-you-get-one/ [https://perma.cc/WF9G-JLQB].
68
See id. It should be noted that Amazon permits a user to delete recordings—or even
the entire history—from its account. Such deletion of the file, however, does not
necessarily guarantee complete deletion of the information contained within that file.
Amazon is less than transparent as to whether deletion from a user’s account also means
deletion from Amazon’s servers. See Conor Allison, How to Delete Your Amazon Alexa
Voice History, AMBIENT (July 3, 2019), https://www.the-ambient.com/how-to/deletevoice-recordings-amazon-alexa-134 [https://perma.cc/VRF3-SKP5]; see also Alfred Ng,
Amazon Alexa Transcripts Live On, Even After You Delete Voice Records, CNET (May 9,
2019, 7:40 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-alexa-transcripts-live-on-evenafter-you-delete-voice-records/ [https://perma.cc/V5KD-PERC]. It should be further noted
that Amazon recently came under scrutiny for allowing recordings to be examined and
studied by human engineers without user consent. See Matt Day, Giles Turner & Natalie
Drozdiak, Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10,
2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-10/is-anyonelistening-to-you-on-alexa-a-global-team-reviews-audio [https://perma.cc/3BZ7-T4WX].
Since that scandal broke, Amazon has revised their policies to allow for users to opt-out of
the human review system. See Matt Day, Amazon Gives Option to Disable Human Review
on Alexa, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-08-02/amazon-gives-option-to-disable-human-review-of-alexa-recordings
[https://perma.cc/D9FY-64R6].
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data to flow freely back and forth from the connected home to
Amazon’s cloud and processing servers.69
Alexa’s ability to learn from and adapt to her surroundings
makes her attractive and unique to a user seeking a customized
concierge experience.70 It also makes her dangerous. Like Audrey
II’s insatiable appetite for blood in Little Shop of Horrors,71 Alexa
feeds on a constant diet of user data. The more data a user provides
about her needs and desires, the better and more tailored the service
that Alexa delivers,72 and in turn, the more the user becomes
enmeshed with and dependent upon Amazon’s ecosystem.73 A
casual or occasional Alexa user might only provide Amazon with
the minimum basic information required to operate the device,
such as one’s name or email. If a user wants to expand Alexa’s functionality to facilitate in-app purchases or Amazon Prime home
deliveries, the user might then provide Amazon with a credit card or
banking information, a cell phone number, and a shipping address.
The more sophisticated the convenience a user requires from Alexa,
the more information Alexa (and, by proxy, Amazon) demands to
accomplish each of the requested tasks. For example, in order
for Alexa to place a phone call, she needs to gain access to a user’s
contact list or address book, which might include personal
information about friends, family members, and even business
associates.74 In order to use Alexa to schedule appointments, a user
must not only provide information about what kinds of services are
required, but also grant Alexa access to cloud-based calendars.75 To
employ Alexa to hail an Uber, a user must grant Alexa access to her
69
See Aaron Paul Calvin, Can Amazon’s Alexa Be Your Friend?, DIGG (Mar. 30, 2017,
9:44 PM), http://digg.com/2017/amazon-alexa-is-not-your-friend [https://perma.cc/34EP3C5H].
70
See id.
71
See LITTLE SHOP OF HORRORS (Warner Bros. 1986).
72
See Calvin, supra note 69 (explaining that the more one uses the device, the more
Alexa adapts to speech patterns, vocabulary, and personal preferences).
73
See Schwab, supra note 7.
74
See Jake Smith, Amazon Alexa Calling: How to Set It Up and Use It on Your Echo,
ZDNET (May 30, 2017, 1:42 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon-alexa-callinghow-to-set-it-up-and-use-it/ [https://perma.cc/F2JD-4T3L].
75
See Hugh Langley, How to Link and Use Your Calendar with Alexa, AMBIENT (July
19,
2019),
https://www.the-ambient.com/how-to/schedule-sync-calendar-alexa-640
[https://perma.cc/UCJ5-QBHX].
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GPS location data, the information about her destination, as well
as direct access to the user’s Uber account, which may contain
credit card information, contact information, and other personal (or
personally identifiable) information.76 With each interaction, Alexa
and her neural network become increasingly privy to larger volumes
of a user’s personal information and more entrenched in that
user’s daily life. Behind the scenes, Amazon gains greater access
to the perpetual collection, storage, and manipulation of the
user’s information.
Part of Alexa’s appeal is that she can be further tailored to cater
to her user’s every whim through the acquisition of “skills”—
downloadable third-party add-ons, similar to mobile phone apps,
that increase her aptitude, intelligence and functionality.77 As of
January 2019, the Amazon marketplace boasted over seventy
thousand skills that Alexa had the potential to “learn.”78 Alexa’s
modularity and upgradeability increase her attractiveness as a virtual
assistant and help to maintain the allure of the integrated invisible
concierge experience that Amazon desires for its customers.
Amazon aspires for Alexa to permeate every facet of daily
79
life —to be omnipresent and indispensable.80 Based on recent
76

See Britta O’Boyle, What Is Alexa and What Can Amazon Echo Do?, POCKET-LINT
(Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.pocket-lint.com/smart-home/news/amazon/138846-what-isalexa-how-does-it-work-and-what-can-amazons-alexa-do
[https://perma.cc/EV2XRYFP]; Privacy Policy: Data Collections and Uses, UBER, https://privacy.uber.com/
policy/ [https://perma.cc/XQS6-HV9Q] (effective May 25, 2018) (describing how Uber
and its affiliates collect and use personal information to provide services). For a detailed
explanation of personally identifiable information, see Campbell-Dollaghan, supra note
10.
77
See Eric Griffith & Rob Marvin, The Best Amazon Alexa Skills, PC MAGAZINE (June
12, 2018, 5:40 PM), https://www.pcmag.com/article/352136/the-best-amazon-alexa-skills
[https://perma.cc/EE7K-T9GY].
78
See Dieter Bohn, Amazon Says 100 Million Alexa Devices Have Been Sold—What’s
Next?, VERGE (Jan. 4, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/4/18168565/
amazon-alexa-devices-how-many-sold-number-100-million-dave-limp [https://perma.cc/
VM3Y-Q3DC].
79
See Heather Kelly, Amazon Wants Alexa Everywhere, CNN BUS. (Sept. 22, 2018,
10:14 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/09/22/technology/alexa-everywhere/index.html
[https://perma.cc/28QK-5F3H].
80
See Scott Davis, How Amazon’s Brand and Customer Experience Became
Synonymous, FORBES (July 14, 2016, 2:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottdavis/
2016/07/14/how-amazons-brand-and-customer-experience-became-synonymous/
[https://perma.cc/W6CG-5CP5].
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statistics, the company is well on its way to achieving that goal.
Although usually reluctant to divulge actual market share or sales
figures, Amazon’s Senior Vice President of Devices and Services,
Dave Limp, recently revealed that as of January 2019, the company
had sold over one hundred million Alexa-equipped devices worldwide81 and increased its annual domestic Prime subscriptions by ten
million to reach over one hundred million U.S. subscribers.82 In
light of these figures, it is interesting to note that over 150 Alexaequipped products currently exist on the market, but fewer than fifty
of those products are actually manufactured by Amazon.83 Those
two seemingly disparate figures coexist with Amazon’s blessing
because the true value to Amazon lies in the information that can be
mined from users’ adoption and integration of the AI, not in the
nominal profit derived from the sale of the devices themselves.84
Alexa extracts the data; therefore, Alexa exerts the power.85
C. The Rise and Influence of Big Data
Data collection and data mining—the siphoning and analyzing
of a subject’s data in order to predict future events or behaviors86—
is not a novel concept borne out of the twenty-first century. On the
contrary, its origins date back to at least the eighteenth century and
81

See Bohn, supra note 78. This figure represents total units sold containing Alexa; it
does not break down by specific devices. See id.
82
See J. Clement, Number of Amazon Prime Members in the United States as of June
2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/546894/number-of-amazon-primepaying-members/ [https://perma.cc/84J6-LCN3] (citing that as of June 2019, Amazon had
an estimated 105 million U.S. Amazon Prime subscribers).
83
See id.; see also Bohn, supra note 78.
84
See Tom Simonite, Alexa Gives Amazon a Powerful Data Advantage, MIT TECH. REV.
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603380/alexa-gives-amazon-apowerful-data-advantage/ [https://perma.cc/GS83-HCMT]; see also Kelly, supra note 79.
85
See Antonio Garcia Martinez, No, Data Is Not the New Oil, WIRED (Feb. 26, 2019,
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/no-data-is-not-the-new-oil [https://perma.cc/
G6PG-SC32]; see also Kelly, supra note 79.
86
Technically, data mining refers to the “computational process of discovering patterns
in large data sets involving methods at the intersection of artificial intelligence, machine
learning, statistics, Predictive analytics, and database systems,” while data collection refers
to “the process of gathering and measuring information usually with software.” See Data
Mining vs Data Collection, IMPORT.IO (Apr. 19, 2014), https://www.import.io/post/datamining-vs-data-collection/ [https://perma.cc/AL37-QWCW]. In this Note, data mining and
data collection are used somewhat interchangeably as the concept of Big Data as employed
by companies like Amazon incorporates both.
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the publication of Reverend Thomas Bayes’ An Essay Towards
Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, in which he outlined
a formula that could analyze presented evidence to determine the
statistical probability of an event’s occurrence.87 Drawing on
the principles of conditional probability—the relation of current
probability to prior probability—Bayes’ Theorem described in
mathematical terms how the likelihood of achieving one’s desired
hypothesis will be affected by the presentation of certain evidence
or the knowledge of other probabilities.88 Modern data scientists
used Bayes’ predictive theorem to form the foundational basis for
all modern machine learning data mining.89
Although Bayes’ Theorem had been used by mathematicians for
over 250 years, it was not until the 1990s that significant advances
in computer hardware, algorithms, and database technology finally
allowed data scientists employed by retail and financial industries
to analyze consumer data and recognize trends that would predict
fluctuations in interest rates, stock prices, and customer demand,
thus producing increases in their respective customer bases.90 Built
upon the data collection processes of the 1960s and the data access
models of the 1980s, the 1990s version of data mining remained
entrenched in a retrospective evaluation of the provided data.91 In
other words, the algorithms could identify trends and patterns in the
data, but only as a result of what had occurred in the past. Big Data,
the twenty-first century embodiment of data mining, however, is

87

See Thomas Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances,
in 53 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 370, 414 (1763).
88
See Andrew Ellinor et al., Bayes’ Theorem and Conditional Probability, BRILLIANT,
https://brilliant.org/wiki/bayes-theorem/ [https://perma.cc/HX9Y-FLPD]; see also Rod
Pierce, Bayes’ Theorem, MATH IS FUN, https://www.mathsisfun.com/data/bayestheorem.html [https://perma.cc/R5LN-ZH6J].
89
See Khyati Mahendru, An Introduction to the Powerful Bayes’ Theorem for Data
Science Professionals, ANALYTICS VIDHYA (June 13, 2019), https://www.analyticsvidhya.
com/blog/2019/06/introduction-powerful-bayes-theorem-data-science/
[https://perma.cc/99GR-9WC6].
90
See Ray Li, History of Data Mining, HACKER BITS, https://hackerbits.com/
data/history-of-data-mining/ [https://perma.cc/9YC2-HURV].
91
See The History of Data Mining: Big Data, EXASTAX BLOG (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.exastax.com/big-data/the-history-of-data-mining/
[https://perma.cc/T5EJ9U2S].
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prospective.92 It combines artificial intelligence and machine learning with data science and database theory to deliver comprehensive
predictive analytics.93 Put another way, today’s data mining capabilities allow companies like Amazon to collect information that a
consumer shares in the present and analyze the information in order
to anticipate how that same consumer will act in the future.94
For Amazon, the use of Big Data translates into big profits.95
Although the specifics behind Amazon’s algorithms and analytics
remain opaque, safeguarded behind the black box of proprietary
trade secret information, the general concept driving its data collection is well known.96 “We see our customers as invited guests to
a party, and we are the hosts. It’s our job every day to make every
important aspect of the customer experience a little bit better,”
asserts CEO Jeff Bezos.97 Bezos’s desire to make life “better” for
his customers translates into ensuring that a customer’s transaction
of goods and services through Amazon’s sites and products remains
both seamless and effortless.98 To accomplish this, Amazon collects
and stores copious amounts of data about its customers.99 It then
takes the collected data, analyzes it through proprietary algorithms,
and generates predictive suggestions for products and services that
each user might be inclined to purchase.100 By employing targeted
92

“Big data analytics is the use of advanced analytic techniques against very large,
diverse data sets . . . . [B]ig data comes from sensors, devices, video/audio, networks, log
files, transactional applications, web, and social media—much of it generated in real time
and at a very large scale.” Big Data Analytics, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/analytics/
hadoop/big-data-analytics [https://perma.cc/M2FA-J7YH].
93
See The History of Data Mining: Big Data, supra note 91.
94
See Alexander Furnas, Everything You Wanted to Know About Data Mining but Were
Afraid to Ask, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2012/04/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-data-mining-but-were-afraid-toask/255388/ [https://perma.cc/VTS2-HXHY].
95
See Jon Markman, Amazon Using AI, Big Data to Accelerate Profits, FORBES (June
5, 2017, 9:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmarkman/2017/06/05/amazon-usingai-big-data-to-accelerate-profits/#285c503a6d55 [https://perma.cc/V6GT-2X7P].
96
See Furnas, supra note 94.
97
Robert Binns, Amazon CRM Case Study, EXPERT MKT., https://www.expert
market.co.uk/crm-systems/amazon-crm-case-study [https://perma.cc/E65V-3K7W].
98
See id.
99
See Lou Carlozo, How Online Retailers Collect & Use Consumer Data, DEALNEWS
(Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.dealnews.com/features/How-Online-Retailers-Collect-UseConsumer-Data/938928.html [https://perma.cc/8RPZ-KKGS].
100
See id.
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advertising, utilizing content-specific upsells, and offering incentives such as Prime’s free shipping, Amazon creates the perfect
conditions to encourage and facilitate the completion of that purchase.101 It is by purposeful design that Amazon endeavors to keep
its users within its own ecosystem.102
D. The Harm of the Digital Dossier
The behaviorally tailored, predictive concierge experience that
Amazon promises through Alexa requires the extraction of vast
amounts of information from its users. Each encounter or
“Interaction”103 with a user helps Alexa to learn more about her
subject. Because Alexa is voice-activated rather than text-based, the
data recorded from Interactions provides Amazon with more than
just digital bytes of information—it offers a user’s context and
intent.104 Additionally, the placement of Alexa inside a private
environment such as a home affects the quality of information to
which the smart assistance is privy. Home users, viewing Alexa as
a friend or confidante, feel extremely comfortable willingly105
disclosing personal, sensitive, and sometimes even confidential
information in her presence.106 However, Alexa is neither a friend
nor a confidante, but rather a sophisticated learning center whose
main goal is to siphon information from her users for Amazon’s
gain. None of the information recorded is kept in confidence.107 All
101

See Minda Zetlin, Here’s How Amazon Gets You to Buy More Stuff, INC. (June 29,
2017),
https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/heres-how-amazon-gets-you-to-buy-morestuff.html [https://perma.cc/3J34-2QWZ].
102
See Kelly, supra note 79.
103
See Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2FEchq5 [https://perma.cc/RX9JP3J7]. “Interactions” is an Amazon-coined term for communiqués between Alexa and her
subject. Id.
104
See Sarah Vizard, Amazon Reveals How It Thinks About Advertising, MARKETING
WK. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.marketingweek.com/2017/09/15/amazon-revealsadvertising/ [https://perma.cc/29BM-LP84].
105
See Alexa Terms of Use, supra note 103.
106
See, e.g., Calvin, supra note 69 (citing various examples of users who treat Alexa as
a friend or confidante).
107
See Kate O’Flaherty, Amazon Staff Are Listening to Alexa Conversations, FORBES
(Apr. 12, 2019, 11:54 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2019/04/12/
amazon-staff-are-listening-to-alexa-conversations-heres-what-to-do/#3a571b3671a2
[https://perma.cc/QY6H-6CX4] (explaining that Amazon’s workers listen to the
recordings and that experts have expressed that smart speakers are unsecured).
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of the information gets transported over the internet back to Amazon’s servers to be stored, manipulated, and re-purposed as Amazon
sees fit.108
To be fair, the raw data that Amazon collects via Alexa has little
to no value on its own. Amazon only derives value from the data
once it is analyzed and synthesized by Amazon’s algorithms
to extract and produce secondary data sets that Amazon can then
employ to more accurately predict the actions of its consumers.109
This generated, proprietary data—what Harvard economist
Shoshana Zuboff terms “behavioral surplus”110—is stored
in perpetuity111 within personalized digital dossiers112 on Amazon’s
servers.113 The subsequent use (or abuse) of this behavioral surplus
drives surveillance capitalism,114 creating and fostering a codependent and often exploitative relationship between data subjects
and data brokers.115
108

See Jennifer Pattison Tuohy & Hugh Langley, Smart Home Privacy: What Amazon,
Google and Apple Do with Your Data, AMBIENT (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.theambient.com/features/how-amazon-google-apple-use-smart-speaker-data-338
[https://perma.cc/29WB-L8TK].
109
See Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/05/06/data-is-giving-rise-to-a-new-economy
[https://perma.cc/L9MM-GLGF] (explaining that data centers extract value from raw
digital information).
110
See John Naughton, Welcome to the Age of Surveillance Capitalism, GUARDIAN (Jan.
20, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/20/shoshanazuboff-age-of-surveillance-capitalism-google-facebook [https://perma.cc/Z5NC-G9CU].
111
See Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2YkU3kE
[https://perma.cc/D6NN-NBEF]. But see Allison, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
112
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 1 (2004) (the term “digital dossier” is borrowed from this text).
113
See Where Does Amazon’s Alexa Pull Data From?, PROTECT AM.: HOME SECURITY
BLOG (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.protectamerica.com/home-security-blog/tech-tips/
where-does-amazon-s-alexa-pull-data-from_15724 [https://perma.cc/E8RJ-KYGU].
114
Surveillance capitalism refers to “selling access to the real-time flow of your daily
life—your reality—in order to directly influence and modify your behavior for profit.”
Shoshana Zuboff, The Secrets of Surveillance Capitalism, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
(May 3, 2016, 1:23 PM), https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/the-digitaldebate/shoshana-zuboff-secrets-of-surveillance-capitalism-14103616.html
[https://perma.cc/Z5N9-VYJJ]. For a more in-depth explanation and exploration of the
phenomenon and its impact on privacy today, see generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE
OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF
POWER (2019).
115
See Naughton, supra note 110.
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To be clear, the fact that Amazon collects information on its
consumers—especially information provided with informed
consent116—is not in and of itself harmful.117 Further, Amazon’s
subsequent synthesis and analysis of the collected data does not suggest that the company has an inherent malicious or injurious intent
toward its consumers. However, Amazon’s massive aggregation and
perpetual storage of its users’ personal data, which is segmented into
individualized digital dossiers and algorithmically employed to
anticipate or influence the behavioral patterns of customers—all of
which occurs in the absence of regulation—raises extreme concerns
over the integrity and security of individuals’ data privacy.
Data companies such as Amazon lure customers with the
promise of convenience in exchange for an illusion of trust.118 They
ask that individual consumers trust them to allow for the installation
of surveillance equipment and software into their most intimate
spheres, such as the home. They ask that individuals trust them to
effectively secure collected data, maintain its integrity, and employ
the proceeds in the best interest of the consumer only. At no point
do these companies substantively or legally define the parameters
(or, quite frankly, even the meaning) of this implied trust, and rarely,
if ever, do these companies reciprocate it.119 Instead, companies hide

116

See Alexa Terms of Use, supra note 103.
See, e.g., Mark Sullivan, Actually, I Want to Hand Over Even More of My Personal
Data to Big Tech, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90315
789/actually-i-want-to-hand-over-even-more-of-my-data-to-big-tech
[https://perma.cc/
KE86-7Y7L] (arguing that there are benefits that can be derived from providing Big Tech
personal data—i.e., “proactively remov[ing] the mundanities and friction points of
everyday life, and know[ing] what I need practically before I do”).
118
See Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, supra note 111 (“Amazon knows that
you care how information about you is used, and we appreciate your trust that we will do
so carefully and sensibly.”). (emphasis added).
119
See, e.g., Warwick Ashford, Uber Recognises Need for Consumer Trust After Breach
Cover Up, COMPUTERWEEKLY (Nov. 22, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.computer
weekly.com/news/450430525/Uber-recognises-need-for-consumer-trust-after-breachcover-up [https://perma.cc/7DD9-3FXT] (detailing how Uber covered up a customer data
breach); Carly Page, Amazon Suffers Data Breach but Remains Tight-Lipped on Details,
INQUIRER (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/3066757/amazondata-breach-2018-black-friday [https://perma.cc/8DJ9-J2X3] (suggesting that there was
more to the data breach than Amazon disclosed to its customers); Natasha Singer, What
You Don’t Know About How Facebook Uses Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/facebook-privacy-hearings.html
117

282

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:261

behind the impenetrable black box of algorithms and trade secrets
to prevent individuals from knowing or understanding how their
data is being processed, stored, and used (or reused).120
Absent comprehensive federal data privacy legislation to
uniformly regulate the collection, storage, and manipulation of
customer data, the only glue holding the current U.S. paradigm
together is the illusive idea of trust that exists between the data
consumer and the data collector. Professor Jack Balkin has
embraced this notion of trust to advocate for a new regulatory model
in which data collectors function as “information fiduciaries” on
behalf of their consumers.121 Drawing upon the tenets of agency law,
Balkin argues that in the Digital Information Age where consumers
have entrusted technology companies with their private data, those
companies should be held to the same legal obligations as doctors
or lawyers to act as fiduciaries and uphold the duties of care,
confidentiality, and loyalty to use collected information in the best
interest of the consumer only.122 In this way, the illusion of trust that
has been falsely established may continue unabated, but the
consumer can rest easy knowing her data will be protected.
Mere trust alone, however, cannot shoulder the incredible burden of ensuring that data brokers such as Amazon will not abuse or
breach the implied duties of confidentiality and loyalty owed to and
expected by their users; mere trust alone cannot provide a remedy to

[https://perma.cc/N8UL-CEE6] (explaining how Facebook employed user data without
consent).
120
See Tim Wu, An American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May
30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/europe-america-privacy-gdpr.
html [https://perma.cc/UF7T-6N43] (explaining how companies like Amazon hold
themselves as trustworthy yet fail to be transparent with their consumers about their data
practices).
121
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183, 1186 (2016); see also Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain
to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.
com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/ [https://perma.cc/6A47JKCD].
122
See Balkin, supra note 121, at 1201, 1226.
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an individual when one’s data is breached,123 misappropriated,124 or
employed in a manner that inflicts harm.125 Further, as Lina Kahn
and David Pozen recently articulated in their pushback to Balkin’s
information fiduciary theory, a user’s trust in data collectors to handle their information with loyalty, confidentiality or care is wholly
misplaced.126 The end game of tech companies is profit; information
equals profit, and current corporate law forbids putting the user’s
privacy needs ahead of the shareholder’s bottom line.127 As such,
Big Tech companies such as Amazon will continue to push the
boundaries of acceptable privacy norms, and it is only a matter of
time before those boundaries will cease to be an effective bulwark
from harm. As the tentacles of Big Data and Big Tech continue to
embed themselves within the innermost sanctums of users’ lives, it
is imperative that the United States establishes an efficient legal
framework to effectively regulate data collectors and to protect the
personal data privacy interests of the consumer.
II. THE CURRENT U.S. PRIVACY FRAMEWORK: A SECTORAL
REGIME RELIANT ON FIPPS, NOTICE AND CHOICE, AND THE FTC
A. A Difference in Approach: Comprehensive vs. Sectoral
When it comes to protecting the data privacy interests of the
individual, the United States has long trailed behind its European

123
See Glenn Fleishman, Equifax Data Breach, One Year Later, FORTUNE (Sept. 7,
2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/09/07/equifax-data-breach-one-year-anniversary/
[https://perma.cc/LU8P-SJWQ]; see also Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No
Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breachno-excuse/ [https://perma.cc/9LYJ-UZFF].
124
See Robinson Meyer, The Cambridge Analytica Scandal, in Three Paragraphs,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/thecambridge-analytica-scandal-in-three-paragraphs/556046/
[https://perma.cc/ZNU3C5E3].
125
See Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant Before Her
Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#3b57
679b6668 [https://perma.cc/5ZEB-FKFS] (explaining how Target used consumer data to
determine a woman was pregnant before she had informed her family).
126
See Lina M. Kahn & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries,
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author).
127
See id. at 6–10.
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counterparts.128 In large part, this is a result of intrinsic differences
in the philosophies underlying the conceptions of personal and
data privacy and the ways in which government should endeavor
to oversee and regulate its protection. Having borne witness to
the extermination of entire populations based on the whims of
tyrannical regimes,129 many countries within the EU vehemently
protect individual privacy as a fundamental human right.130 This
freedom has since been codified in the EU Charter, which recognizes a right to privacy in one’s personal data131 as well as a “right
to the respect of privacy” within one’s home.132
In contrast, the United States, a country founded on the celebration of the individual and freedom of expression,133 conceives of
data as a personal and commercial asset134 and privacy as a personal,
autonomous choice.135 Although the courts have inferred a general
right to privacy in various amendments,136 nowhere in the text of the
128

See Thomas Holt, Data Privacy Rules in the EU May Leave the U.S. Behind, GOV’T.
TECH. (Jan. 24, 2019), http://www.govtech.com/computing/Data-Privacy-Rules-in-theEU-May-Leave-the-US-Behind.html [https://perma.cc/HXM8-DV3C].
129
See Olivia B. Waxman, The GDPR Is Just the Latest Example of Europe’s Caution
on Privacy Rights. That Outlook Has a Disturbing History, TIME (May 24, 2018),
https://time.com/5290043/nazi-history-eu-data-privacy-gdpr/
[https://perma.cc/54F35NXZ] (positing that Nazi Germany and the Stasi’s misuse of compiled personal data for
heinous crimes has led to Europe’s protective stance on privacy).
130
See Mark Scott & Natasha Singer, How Europe Protects Your Online Data Differently
Than the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/
29/technology/data-privacy-policy-us-europe.html [https://perma.cc/L7Y3-PN94].
131
See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 8, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 391, 397 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
132
See id. art. 7, at 397.
133
See Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, GDPR: How Is It Different from U.S. Law & Why
This Matters?, LEXOLOGY BLOG (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=4b2843f7-f67a-4015-bca9-96bd2fe344c9 [https://perma.cc/F23W-TLYN].
134
See Andrada Coos, EU v US: How Do Their Data Privacy Regulations Square Off?,
ENDPOINT PROTECTOR BLOG (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.endpointprotector.com/blog/euvs-us-how-do-their-data-protection-regulations-square-off/
[https://perma.cc/YY9WAFGJ].
135
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 198 (arguing that the law “secures to each
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others”).
136
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–486 (1965) (inferring from the
Fourteenth Amendment a right of marital privacy which should be protected against state
restrictions on contraception); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967)
(establishing within the Fourth Amendment the concept of a subjective expectation of
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Constitution is such freedom explicitly guaranteed or safeguarded.
Instead, the choice to maintain personal privacy receives limited
constitutional and statutory protection from governmental
intrusion137 and relegates violations by private entities to the law of
tort, contract, and other civil causes of action.138 As Joel R.
Reidenberg, a privacy expert at Fordham University School of Law,
has observed, “In Europe the first line of defense against private
wrongdoing is the state. In the U.S. our instinct is more liberal: Let
private actors sue each other.”139
The philosophical distinctions in privacy between the United
States and the EU may also be evidenced in the current regulatory
frameworks governing each. In May 2018, the EU enacted the
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), an omnibus privacy
legislation that comprehensively applies one unified code to all
twenty-eight member states.140 The GDPR imbues the individual
with the power to control and regulate the collection, storage, and
manipulation of his own personal information.141 Acting as a
privacy “bill of rights,” the GDPR provides an individual with the
right to know what types of information a business collects on him,
to access the collected information, to rectify errors in the collected
information, to withdraw consent at any time for the collection of
such information, to object to the processing (or automated processing) of personal data, to port data, and to have any collected data
permanently erased.142

privacy); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (finding
unconstitutional a housing ordinance that invaded the privacy of an extended family’s
living arrangement).
137
See supra Section I.A.
138
See Richards & Solove, supra note 39, at 1918 (explaining the failure of the privacy
torts to protect against the intrusion of the media or adapt to new privacy problems such as
the collection of private data by businesses).
139
Bob Sullivan, ‘La Difference’ Is Stark in EU, U.S. Privacy Laws, NBC NEWS (Oct.
19, 2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15221111/ns/technology_and_science-privacy_
lost/t/la-difference-stark-eu-us-privacy-laws/ [https://perma.cc/E575-PM2T].
140
See generally Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].
141
See id.
142
See id. ch. 3, arts. 15–22, at 43–46.
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More than a mere piece of legislation, however, the GDPR represents a marked shift in the ethos and privacy norms that emerged
in the E.U. post-9/11.143 With the increased state surveillance
following the attacks, individuals were particularly wary of disclosing information without providing explicit consent.144 One of the
aims of the GDPR was to rebuild consumer trust in sharing information with private companies.145 Another aim of the GDPR was
to limit the predatory practices of businesses.146 “Data should not be
kept simply because storage is cheap. Data should not be processed
simply because algorithms are refined. Safeguards should apply,
and citizens should have rights,” declared EU Vice President
and Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding, during a 2014 European
Data Protection Day celebration.147 The aspirational principles that
Reding has espoused in her speeches—consent, data minimization,
purpose limitation, and confidentiality—are the same guiding
principles that underscore and permeate the various facets of
the GDPR.148
Consent forms one of the guiding cornerstones upon which the
GDPR was built.149 Before an individual’s data may be collected,
stored, or used, the company requesting the data must receive
affirmative consent—unambiguously and voluntarily given—from
the individual to do so, and such consent may be revoked at any
time.150 Data minimization requires that data processors151
143

See Trevor Butterworth, Europe’s Tough New Digital Privacy Law Should Be a Model
for US Policymakers, VOX (May 23, 2018, 6:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/
2018/3/26/17164022/gdpr-europe-privacy-rules-facebook-data-protection-eu-cambridge
[https://perma.cc/3XAY-BCL5].
144
See Viviane Reding, Vice-President, Eur. Comm’n, EU Justice Comm’r, Speech: A
Data Protection Compact for Europe, (Jan. 28, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-62_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6GFS-2M4D].
145
See Viviane Reding, Vice-President, Eur. Comm’n, EU Just. Comm’r, Speech: The
EU Data Protection Reform: Helping Businesses Thrive in The Digital Economy, (Jan. 19,
2014),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-37_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/75XF-M4MZ].
146
See id.
147
Reding, supra note 145; see also Butterworth, supra note 144.
148
See generally GDPR, supra note 141, art. 5, at 35–36.
149
See generally id. art. 7, at 37.
150
See id. art. 7(3), at 37.
151
Under the GDPR, “‘processor’ means a natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.” A
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employ only as much data as is directly relevant and necessary to
successfully accomplish a given task.152 Moreover, any data collected must be limited to a one-purpose use and may not be
repurposed without the express consent of the individual.153
Companies are further required to maintain the integrity and
confidentiality of all collected data154 and to limit the length of time
for which any personal data is stored.155
The comprehensive nature of the GDPR’s regulation ensures
continuity and cohesiveness in its application and enforcement
across all EU member states for individual data and privacy protection. In upgrading from the aspirational guidance of the Data
Protection Directive156 to the mandatory and binding regulation of
the GDPR, the EU signaled its commitment not only to protect
individual data privacy, but also to establish itself as the de facto
international standard for data privacy protection.
Eschewing the one-size-fits-all approach adopted by the EU and
the GDPR, the United States, in contrast, has historically favored a
sector-specific (sectoral) approach to privacy regulation, in which
governmental interference is minimal, and the various industrial
marketplace stakeholders dictate and determine internal oversight
and governance on an as-needed basis.157 The United States’ laissez
faire attitude toward privacy has resulted in the adoption of ad hoc
statutory regulations passed only when exigent circumstances
demand.158 For example, in response to consumer outrage over the
“controller” is defined as “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other
body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data.” Id. art. 4(7)–(8), at 33.
152
See id. art. 5(1)(c), at 35.
153
See id. art. 5(1)(b), at 35.
154
See id. art. 5(1)(f), at 36.
155
See id. art. 5(1)(e), at 36.
156
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 23.
157
See Daniel Solove, The Growing Problems with the Sectoral Approach to Privacy
Law, TEACHPRIVACY: PRIVACY + SECURITY BLOG (Nov. 13, 2015), https://teach
privacy.com/problems-sectoral-approach-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/3YDS-SY64].
158
See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 10 Stat. 1936 (1996) (“HIPAA”), which regulates how PII is maintained by the
healthcare and insurance industries; Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,
113 Stat. 1338 (1999), which governs the collection and disclosure of customers’ personal
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rampant lack of transparency by credit companies who provided
consumer data used to determine credit eligibility, Congress passed
the Fair Credit Reporting Act,159 which regulates the collection of
credit information and access to credit reports.160 Similarly, after
Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s video tape rental history was
disclosed to a reporter during the nomination proceedings, the
Washington, D.C. elite galvanized to pressure Congress to rapidly
pass the Video Privacy Protection Act,161 which creates liability
for the “wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records.162
This fractured approach to regulation creates inconsistencies and
irregularities among the various sectors.163 Unlike the EU, the
United States does not uniformly regulate or protect individual data
privacy. Instead, each policy is based on the type of data collected
and the entity responsible for aggregating and maintaining that
collected data.164 This overlapping patchwork of legislation has
created confusion and contradictions for the consumer who acts as
a data supplier, as well as the various entities that act as information
and data collectors.165
B. The FIPPs
In the early 1970s, the development and incorporation of
computer systems into the workplace led to technological advances
in the collection and retention of personal data. Concerned about the
potential for abuse of these new methods, the Secretary’s Advisory
financial information by financial institutions; Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered section of 18
U.S.C.), which addresses voluntary and compelled disclosure of “stored wire and electronic
communications and transactional records” held by third-party Internet service providers.
159
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018).
160
See FED. TRADE COMM’N., DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY (May 2014).
161
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2018).
162
See Stephen Advokat, Publication of Bork’s Video Rentals Raises Privacy Issues, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 20, 1987), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1987-11-20-87032
70590-story.html [https://perma.cc/2NPA-M957].
163
See Solove, supra note 158.
164
See Solove, supra note 158.
165
For a more detailed explanation of the confusion that the U.S. privacy statutory
scheme creates, see Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and
Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reformingus-approach-data-protection [https://perma.cc/ES6K-5DAQ].
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Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, under the direction of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”),
supervised a study on record-keeping practices in the computer age,
focusing on both government and business (the “HEW Report”).166
The committee recognized the harmful impact that unwanted
disclosure of identifiable information might have on individuals and
the protection of their personal privacy.167 The committee’s findings
instigated the passage of both the Privacy Act of 1974,168 which
regulated the use of personal information by U.S. governmental
agencies, and the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), which established
international guidelines to facilitate the free flow of information
between countries while simultaneously protecting personal data.
Arguably, however, one of the most impactful and lasting
elements of the HEW report was the development of the Fair
Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”). The committee outlined
five major principles169—transparency, use limitation, access and
correction, data quality, and security—that should constitute a
“minimum set of rights” available to the individual.170 Broadly,
these principles delineated an aspirational paradigm to address
global concerns about the protection of individual data privacy
within the ever-evolving technological landscape that threatened to
erode it. The FIPPs further empowered individuals to actively
participate in the collection and retention of their personal data.171
Unfortunately, as adopted and implemented by U.S. law and
the Federal Trade Commission in the 1990s, the broad idealistic
principles of FIPPs were reduced to two narrow legal tenets, which
serve as the backbone for the self-regulatory regime that

166

See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. NO. (OS) 73-94,
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS,
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS ix (1973) [hereinafter HEW REPORT].
167
Id.
168
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974).
169
See HEW REPORT, supra note 167, at xx.
170
See HEW REPORT, supra note 167, at xxi.
171
See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 341, 341–345 (Jane K. Winn ed.,
2006).
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dominates and protects the titans of the private sector: (1) notice
and (2) choice.172
C. Notice and Choice
“Notice” implies transparency. It suggests that prior to gathering
personal info, a data collection entity must only identify what
information is being collected, how the collected information will
be used, and whether any third parties might also obtain access to
the collected information.173 Traditionally the principle of notice has
manifested itself through a company’s privacy policy.174 “Choice”
has become synonymous with consent. It affords a user the opportunity to “opt-in” if one agrees to a company’s proposed privacy
terms. The “choice” element mainly manifests itself as the “agree”
button that appears alongside the Terms of Service notifications
prior to the download of apps, the entrance to a website, or the
installation of software.
Supporters of “notice and choice” applaud the regime for its
preservation of individual autonomy—it puts individuals in charge
of decisions regarding the use and dissemination of their personal
data.175 The regime encourages users to be the arbiters of what is
good or bad for them, without imposing further restrictions on others
or the marketplace as a whole.176 Professor Ryan Calo argues that
this type of informed consent “furnishes consumers with information they would not otherwise have so that they can protect themselves and police the market.”177 Critics of “notice and choice,”
however, fault the regime as illusory, inadequate, and ineffectual.178
Rather than empower individual autonomy, notice and choice
anesthetizes and overwhelms, renders rational decision-making

172

See id. at 355–56.
See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 44 (2015) [hereinafter
Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies].
174
See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 82.
175
See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2012).
176
See id. at 1028.
177
Id. at 1044.
178
See generally Cate, supra note 172.
173
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meaningless,179 and ultimately fails to address the real underlying
issues of privacy and harm that the system was originally designed
to remedy.
For notice to be effective, individuals must be able to read and
understand the stated policies of the entities seeking to collect
personal data. However, in today’s world, where the sectoral regime
encourages a lack of uniformity across data collection platforms,
and almost all information flows are controlled by third parties, the
achievement of true notice seems overwhelming, if not impossible.
Lorrie Faith Cranor, director of the Carnegie Mellon Usable Privacy
and Security Laboratory, estimates that in order for individuals to
actually read through all the terms and conditions that are presented
to them by third parties each year, they would have to devote
between 180 to 300 hours a year, which roughly translates to
dedicating about forty minutes each day.180 Amazon’s terms and
conditions alone would take approximately nine hours to digest.181
Because of the sheer effort involved to accomplish the task, few, if
any, consumers ever read the relevant privacy policies posted by
collectors of personal data, thereby rendering ineffective the concept
of notice.
Even if an individual were to read each presented policy, it is
unlikely that he or she would be able to fully comprehend its
contents, so as to make the giving of consent—or choice—a truly
informed decision.182 Although several states have passed
179

See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 84.
See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy
Policies, 4 I/S 543, 563 (2008).
181
See Editorial, How Silicon Valley Puts the ‘Con’ in Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/opinion/internet-facebook-google-consent.
html [https://perma.cc/Y4WC-8Z7S].
182
See Most People Just Click and Accept Privacy Policies Without Reading Them—You
Might Be Surprised at What They Allow Companies to Do, NBR (Feb. 7, 2019),
http://nbr.com/2019/02/07/most-people-just-click-and-accept-privacy-policies-withoutreading-them-you-might-be-surprised-at-what-they-allow-companies-to-do/
[https://perma.cc/HS66-FGXX] (quoting Brian Vecci, the field chief technology officer for
Varonis, a cybersecurity company that focuses on securing data: “[Privacy policies are] not
designed for consumers, for you and me, to understand. They’re written by lawyers for
lawyers to protect the company”); see also Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t
Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-aprivacy-policy-is/ [https://perma.cc/959Q-SZ6D] (quoting Joseph Turow, Professor of
180
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legislation to require that companies write their online privacy
policies in clear, precise, and non-legal language in order to help
consumers better understand the scope of the information collected,
such standardization has not been uniformly adopted nor federally
mandated.183 As a result, most companies pay lip service to satisfy
the principle of “notice” by writing their policies in dense
legalese,184 with vague and ambiguous185 language that obfuscates
the true nature of the information being amassed and often forces
individuals to consent to the collection of more data than necessary
to accomplish a required task.186 Thus, a vicious cycle ensues:
company failures to adequately notify lead to consumer failures to
properly choose.
Choice in today’s oversaturated online market is not only
illusory but often impossible. Choice should represent “giving
consumers options as to how any personal information collected
from them may be used.”187 However, because privacy policies are
one-size-fits-all, and in practice cannot be tailored, altered, or
user-customized, the once-empowering concept of autonomous
choice has been essentially reduced to “choosing” between de facto
acceptance of the stated terms or complete forfeiture of the use of
the desired app, website, or software.

Communications and scholar of digital marketing and privacy issues at the University of
Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication: “Many people don’t actually read
privacy policies; they simply look at the label. . . . And the intuitive understanding—the
cultural understanding—of the label is that when something says ‘privacy policy,’ it
protects your privacy”).
183
See, e.g., California Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§
22575–22579 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42–471 (2017) (limited to businesses who
collect Social Security numbers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1205C (2015); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 603A.340 (2017).
184
See Alan Henry, Useable Privacy Shows You What Privacy Policies Actually Mean,
in Plain English, LIFEHACKER (Mar. 20, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://lifehacker.com/usableprivacy-shows-you-what-privacy-policies-actually-1764431489 [https://perma.cc/J8XBM25Y]; see also Joseph Turow & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The FTC and Consumer Privacy
in the Coming Decade, 3 I/S 723, 731 (2006).
185
See Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Ambiguity in Privacy Polices and the Impact of
Regulation, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S163, S163–64 (2016).
186
See Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies, supra note 174, at 46.
187
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (1998) [hereinafter
FTC 1998 REPORT].
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D. The FTC: The De Facto Privacy Regulator
Despite the publication of the HEW Report, the passage of the
Privacy Act of 1974, and the decades-long warnings by consumer
advocate groups of the potential for abuse of computerized record
keeping, Congress has never created or even officially delegated
oversight of consumer data privacy to any federal agency. Following
a congressional invitation to investigate privacy risks posed by
computer databases in the late 1990s, however, the FTC essentially
volunteered to assume the watchdog mantle, and, over the past two
decades, has steadily emerged as the country’s de facto consumer
privacy regulator.188
The FTC’s effectiveness in regulating consumer privacy,
however, has been hotly debated. Champions of the agency’s
efficacy hail its regulatory influence as “formidable.”189 Critics
rebuke it as “toothless.”190 The reality lies somewhere in between.
While the agency has made great strides in establishing an oversight
regime where none previously existed, limits to its (1) chosen scope
of enforcement, (2) statutory powers, and (3) physical capacity have
ultimately diminished the FTC’s ability to efficiently address and
effectively curtail the onslaught of privacy concerns emerging from
today’s rapidly expanding and innovative tech sector.
The FTC derives its consumer regulatory authority from Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the “Act” or “FTC Act”).191
Under the Act, the FTC has the power to investigate and resolve
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”192
with prosecution possible through both administrative and judicial
proceedings.193 Like most federal agencies, the FTC technically has
188

For an in-depth look at how the FTC emerged as the privacy regulator, see generally
Steven Hetcher, The De Facto Federal Privacy Commission, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 109 (2000).
189
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COL. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014).
190
See Peter Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive, Toothless,
WIRED (June 28, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/06/ftc-fail/
[https://perma.cc/GU8W-LSFV].
191
See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018).
192
Id. § 45(a)(1).
193
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S
INVESTIGATIVE & LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY pt. 2, sec. A. (July 2008).
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the ability to conduct oversight through adjudication194 and rulemaking.195 However, the passage of the Magnuson–Moss Act196 and
the FTC Improvements Act of 1980197 significantly curtailed the
agency’s ability to conduct oversight through rulemaking.198 As a
result, the agency has declined to promulgate comprehensive
privacy-specific trade regulations, opting instead to monitor the
private sector almost entirely through ad hoc adjudications.199 While
this case-specific process allows for flexibility and adaptability amid
a rapidly expanding technological sector,200 it ultimately limits the
reach and sector-wide effectiveness of the FTC’s oversight. Ad hoc
adjudication commences only after a violation has occurred,
whereas rulemaking can act prophylactically by proscribing
violative behavior before it transpires.
The FTC is further limited by its statutory inability to
proactively levy fines on businesses. Per Section 5 of the FTC Act,
the FTC may only impose monetary sanctions on a business for
violating an FTC cease and desist order or an FTC consent decree.201
Substantially, this means that before a business will suffer any
financial consequences for its violative actions, it must first commit
an offense, be sanctioned by the FTC, agree to settle for that offense,
and then commit that same offense again in violation of the original
settlement agreement. This bureaucratic inefficiency allows for
multiple transgressions to occur before a company has to
proverbially “pay the piper.” Similar to the issue with adjudications,
the FTC’s lack of authority to issue civil penalties against a

194

See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2018).
See id. § 57(a).
196
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2018).
197
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-52, §§ 7–12,
94 Stat. 374, 376–80.
198
See Barry B. Boyer, Executive Summary of Barry B. Boyer Report: Trade Regulation
Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission, in 1979 ACUS
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 79–1, at 41.
199
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-52, INTERNET PRIVACY: ADDITIONAL
FEDERAL AUTHORITY COULD ENHANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY
11 (2019) [hereinafter GAO-19-52]; see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, It’s Time to Remove the
“Mossified” Procedures for FTC Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1979, 1989 (2015).
200
See GAO-19-52, supra note 200, at 25.
201
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (2018).
195
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company for its initial violation reduces the agency’s effectiveness
in deterring harmful actions.
Section 5 of the FTC Act grants the agency expansive authority
to protect consumers from deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition within the marketplace;202 however, the FTC has
elected to apply this broad mandate quite narrowly. To combat
privacy concerns raised by the collection of consumer data in
the emerging online landscape, the agency has chosen to focus on a
market-based approach—encouraging “effective self-regulation”
among private sector businesses rather than promulgating and
instituting comprehensive sector-wide rules.203 In a series of
congressional reports issued in the late 1990s, the FTC advocated
for businesses to employ the “core” FIPPs when designing
consumers’ informational privacy protections,204 and further maintained that these principles should form the basis of any federal
legislation or regulation involving the control of businesses’ online
consumer data collection.205 In reality, however, the FTC eschewed
many of the FIPPs and instead focused its oversight almost
exclusively on notice (via “privacy policies”) and choice (via
“opt-in” mechanisms).206 On the one hand, the agency’s actions
helped to foster the innovation, growth, and expansion of a nascent
202

See id. § 45(a), (n).
FTC 1998 REPORT, supra note 188, at 2.
204
In 1998 and 1999, the FTC advocated for five principles: (1) Notice/Awareness,
(2) Choice/Consent, (3) Access/Participation, (4) Integrity/Security, and (5) Enforcement/
Redress. See id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE:
A REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (1999) [hereinafter FTC 1999 REPORT]. By 2000, however, the
FTC had removed Enforcement/Redress as a core principle. See FED. TRADE COMM’N,
PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (2000) [hereinafter FTC 2000 REPORT].
205
See FTC 1998 REPORT, supra note 188, at 7; FTC 1999 REPORT, supra note 205, at 3;
FTC 2000 REPORT, supra note 205, at iii.
206
According to the FTC, “[n]otice” was the “most fundamental” principle, without
which the other principles had no real meaning. See FTC 1998 REPORT, supra note 188, at
7; FTC 1999 REPORT, supra note 205, at 3. Although the reports discussed the principles
of Access and Security, they left most of their recommendations on that front to the
discretion of the businesses. “[T]he Commission believes that Access presents unique
implementation issues that require consideration before its parameters can be defined.”
FTC 2000 REPORT, supra note 205, at 17. “The Commission believes that Security, like
Access, presents unique implementation issues and that the security provided by a Web
site should be ‘adequate’ in light of the costs and benefits.” FTC 2000 REPORT, supra note
205, at 18.
203
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online commercial industry;207 on the other, the FTC’s policies had
the adverse effect of sanctioning predatory data collection methods
by those same entities and industries.208
Further limiting the scope of its regulations, the FTC opts to
bring most of its enforcement actions under the deceptive rather than
unfair practices prong of Section 5 because the former is much
easier to identify and police.209 For the FTC to pursue a practice as
“unfair,” it must cause or be likely to cause “substantial injury to
consumers,” and must be one that consumers cannot reasonably
avoid by other means.210 Further, if a practice is “outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition,” the FTC
will not deem it unfair.211 Such a caveat establishes a particularly
high threshold that is difficult to overcome when considering the
predatory data collection practices that drive the surveillance
economy. The FTC would prefer to focus on ad hoc adjudication of
contract law disputes rather than perform the more difficult task of
proactively promulgating data protection laws.
The FTC’s almost singular focus on violations of notice and
choice permits tech companies like Amazon to use their published
privacy policies as shields against enforcement actions. Tech
companies give notice and inform consumers of their data collection
practices, however egregious they may be. In turn, customers rely
on those same polices to become educated on the substantive level,
if any, of protection that will be afforded to their personal data.212
As these policies are readily available in written format, in the event
that consumer data privacy has been breached, the FTC simply looks
to see if any discrepancies exist between a data collector’s proffered

207

See GAO-19-52, supra note 200, at 1.
See Turow & Hoofnagle, supra note 185, at 728 (arguing that the omission of
the principles of “data minimization” and “purpose specification” from the FTC’s
recommendations has “led firms to collect extraneous information and repurpose
information without consumer consent”).
209
See David Lazarus, FTC Is Falling Short in Protecting Consumers’ Data Used by
Businesses, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-filazarus-20160112-column.html [https://perma.cc/T9PM-9T3N].
210
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2018).
211
Id.
212
See Turow & Hoofnagle, supra note 185, at 744.
208
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guidelines and the actions that it has taken.213 Where a company has
promised to provide protections yet failed to deliver (or delivered
a lesser degree of) protection and privacy was breached (i.e.,
“broken promises”),214 the FTC will endeavor to intervene.215 Such
intervention begins with an inquiry or warning, but more often than
not, ends in a private settlement or consent decree. Over the past
decade, the FTC has brought 101 privacy enforcement actions
against companies, nearly all of which ended in consent decrees.216
In many cases, the penalties inflicted by these consent decrees are
so minimal that offending companies simply view them as a cost of
doing business.217 While such settlements may have an effect
on an errant company’s future behavior, they often fail to provide
any remedy to the aggrieved consumer or even act as a deterrent to
other companies.218
213
See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 82; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC
Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook (July 24,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billionpenalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions [https://perma.cc/73GH-52YN] (explaining
that the fine was a result of “deceptive disclosures and settings” that undermined user
privacy preferences).
214
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 190, at 629.
215
See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., 133 F.T.C. 763 (2002) (failure to protect confidentiality of
user data); Microsoft Corp., 134 F.T.C. 709 (2002) (failure to limit collection of data to the
purposes outlined in privacy policy); Genica Corp., FTC File No. 082 3113, Docket No.
C-4252 (F.T.C. Mar. 16, 2009) (failure to provide adequate security for storage of personal
data).
216
See GAO-19-52, supra note 200, at 22. The statistic refers to FTC internet privacy
enforcement actions filed between July 1, 2008 and June 30, 2018 in which the agency
alleged violations of either the FTC Act or the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(“COPPA”). See id. at 21, 44. But see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,
799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015) (The FTC brought a claim against Wyndham alleging the
company committed unfair practices and that its privacy policy was deceptive.); LabMD,
Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 776 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 2015) (LabMD brought a claim
against the FTC challenging the agency’s efficacy in bringing enforcements proceedings).
217
See Michelle de Mooy, How to Strengthen the FTC Privacy & Security Consent
Decrees, CDT BLOG (Apr. 12, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/how-to-strengthen-the-ftcprivacy-security-consent-decrees/ [https://perma.cc/R6J4-798K].
218
See GAO-19-52, supra note 200, at 21; see also Nitasha Tiku, Why Facebook’s 2011
Promises Haven’t Protected Users, WIRED (Apr. 11, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.wired.
com/story/why-facebooks-2011-promises-havent-protected-users/ [https://perma.cc/RJ4A
-Q7EH]; Sarah Frier, Former FTC Technologist Says Facebook Violated Consent Decree,
BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2018, 4:56 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201806-19/former-ftc-technologist-says-facebook-violated-consent-decree
[https://perma.cc/L9UU-46N3].
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Moreover, the FTC is hamstrung by personnel constraints,
which further restrict its capacity to regulate and enforce. “Our tools
are limited,” admits Maneesha Mithal, Associate Director of the
FTC’s Division of Privacy and Identity Protection.219 Despite
reports that data privacy and the uncontrolled collection of consumer data remain some of the biggest threats facing the nation,220
the FTC, as the de facto privacy agency, staffs only forty full-time
privacy employees and five full-time technologists.221 This pales
in comparison to the 500-person staff of the United Kingdom
Information Commissioner’s Office or the 110-person staff of
Ireland’s Data Protection Commissioner.222 The FTC literally fails
to employ enough people at the agency to adequately monitor and
enforce the increasing threats to privacy resulting from the rapid
expansion of technology and data collection within the private
tech sector.223
Since the FTC has taken up the mantle of federal privacy
watchdog, it has achieved much good.224 However, the limitations
placed on the agency by its narrow scope of focus, statutory restrictions, and physical constraints have produced a quasi-regulatory
regime ill-suited to adapt to a rapidly changing technological landscape that increasingly threatens consumer data privacy. Rather than
create preemptive rules that anticipate privacy concerns before they
erupt into problems, the FTC has instead opted for ad hoc individual

219

Lazarus, supra note 209.
See, e.g., Rethinking Privacy for the AI Era, FORBES: INSIGHTS (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:16
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-intelai/2019/03/27/rethinking-privacy-for-the
-ai-era/ [https://perma.cc/EFX4-F475]; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL
FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 30, 33 (Jan. 2016).
221
See Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: The Government’s Top Silicon Valley
Watchdog Only Has Five Full-Time Technologists. Now It’s Asking Congress for More.,
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2019, 8:47 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost
/paloma/the-technology-202/2019/04/04/the-technology-202-the-government-s-topsilicon-valley-watchdog-only-has-five-full-time-technologists-now-it-s-asking-congressfor-more/5ca512661b326b0f7f38f30d/ [https://perma.cc/3BTV-3S2L].
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See id.
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See, e.g., Maass, supra note 191 (citing multiple examples where FTC oversight was
“scooped” by investigative journalists, foreign agencies, and even ambitious graduate
students).
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See generally Solove & Hartzog, supra note 190.
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adjudications that are piecemeal and reactive.225 Rather than
broaden the scope of its enforcement to prosecute unfair practices,
the FTC has chosen instead to primarily focus on the easier-tomonitor prong of deceptive practices. Consequently, the FTC—the
agency best suited to aggressively and proactively enforce consumer
data privacy safeguards in the new Digital Age of AI—allows
Big Data and Big Tech to push the boundaries of the law, to ask for
forgiveness rather than permission, and to continue to treat
consumer data as their own personal asset.
III. THE LAW’S TREATMENT OF THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER
DATA BY AI
A. The Failure of Notice and Choice to Protect Consumers
In an ideal world, the data privacy laws of the United States
would protect individuals from three categories of harms that could
result from the unauthorized collection, unsafe storage or unlicensed
use of their data: (1) harm to their reputation or autonomy (from the
involuntary release or use of confidential information); (2) harm to
their right of access (resulting from discrimination or bias in the misuse of information); and (3) harm to their financial and economic
stability (resulting from a breach or theft of protected information).226 Unfortunately, with its lack of comprehensive federal
directives, its focus on sectoral oversight heavily reliant on the
principles of “Notice and Choice,” and its emphasis on industry selfregulation, the current data privacy paradigm in the United States
provides no such consumer safeguards. The current privacy framework concentrates almost solely on providing consumers with information in order to create the illusion of control over their data and
privacy, and, in doing so, ignores the more crucial element of
providing protection for the consumer from predatory data collection practices. This framework puts too much onus on the individual
225

For a counter argument that suggests that FTC jurisprudence has developed a
comprehensive body of “law” akin to the common law, see generally Solove & Hartzog,
supra note 190.
226
See Alan McQuinn, Understanding Data Privacy, REAL CLEAR POL’Y (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.realclearpolicy.com/articles/2018/10/25/understanding_data_privacy_11087
7.html [https://perma.cc/6EFY-2X7Y].
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to make “informed” choices and not enough responsibility on the
companies to refrain from engaging in abusive activity or the federal
government to police such violations. The current U.S. data privacy
regime assumes too much and delivers too little.227
Moreover, the law treats the tech sector’s data collection
practices as one-size-fits-all, with almost no distinction made across
divergent platforms about how information is collected, stored or
used. For example, under current U.S. law, Amazon’s AI-facilitated
collection of user data via Alexa receives the same legal treatment
as Amazon’s manual collection of user data through its website or
mobile app.228 In both instances, the law simply expects that
Amazon will choose on its own to implement a fair and trustworthy
process of data collection by providing users with conspicuous
“notice” of its privacy and collection policies and allowing them
the “choice” to opt-out of the use of Amazon’s services should
they disagree.
For its part, Amazon complies fully with the law’s
prescriptions.229 The company conspicuously posts its privacy
policy explaining its data collection practices on its site,230 and it
allows users the choice of whether or not to avail themselves of the
tools within the Amazon ecosystem.231 Because the concept of
engendering consumer trust is embedded in the company’s cultural

227

See supra Section II.C.
See, e.g., Dickinson Wright, The Internet of Toys: Legal and Privacy Issues with
Connected Toys, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx
?g=73ff6361-5a5e-4511-9a12-95da0e16bd63
[https://perma.cc/QX7Y-33PV]
(acknowledging that “the law is behind the technology” and describing how the current
sectoral laws and FTC guidelines apply similarly to data collection across various IoT
gadgets). But see James Thorne, Amazon Adds HIPAA Compliance to Alexa Skills, Opening
Door for Secure Health Apps, GEEKWIRE (Apr. 4, 2019, 7:31 AM), https://www.geekwire.
com/2019/amazon-adds-hipaa-compliance-alexa-skills-opening-door-secure-health-apps/
[https://perma.cc/HU26-CKRZ] (explaining that Alexa’s collection of PII via its new
health skills is governed by HIPAA).
229
As of this writing, Amazon has a conspicuously posted privacy policy and has never
been charged by the FTC with deceptive or unfair practices in relation to its privacy or data
collection policies. See infra note 231.
230
See Amazon Privacy Notice, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201909010 [https://perma.cc/TQ53-CVKJ].
231
Id. (“You can choose not to provide certain information, but then you might not be
able to take advantage of many of our features.”).
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ethos,232 Amazon goes a step further in its policies’ inclusions,
providing examples of the types of information the company collects,233 the ways in which it collects it,234 how it shares that
information with third parties,235 and how individuals might access
their collected data.236 Provided that Amazon then abides by its
posted policies, it has satisfied all of the elements necessary to
comport with existing federal privacy standards.
But what about the protection of the consumer? Is Amazon’s
mere compliance with “Notice and Choice” enough to provide a
comprehensive or transparent assessment of Amazon’s intent for all
of the data collected? Does Amazon’s inclusion of a legal disclaimer
that their privacy policy can and will be amended based solely on
the company’s whims237 inherently negate any suggested protection
implied by the policy itself, or make impossible customer reliance

232
See David Marino-Nachison, Jeff Bezos: Customer Trust ‘Is What Allows You to
Expand’, BARRON’S (Sept. 4, 2018, 5:04 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/jeffbezos-customer-trust-is-what-allows-you-to-expand-1536095054 [https://perma.cc/S2KN
-2ZT7] (quoting Jeff Bezos: “[Customer trust is] very valuable, and so you would never do
anything to jeopardize it.”).
233
See Amazon Privacy Notice, supra note 231.
234
See id.
235
See id.
236
See id. (“Amazon.com gives you access to a broad range of information about your
account and your interactions with Amazon.com for the limited purpose of viewing and, in
certain cases, updating that information.”). The “broad access” that Amazon purports to
give, however, is extremely limited to the raw data that the user initially provides, rather
than the algorithmically generated data that Amazon subsequently employs. Amazon
provides the following as examples of available data:
Examples of information you can access easily at Amazon.com include
up-to-date information regarding recent orders; personally identifiable
information (including name, e-mail, password, communications
and personalized advertising preferences, address book, and 1-Click
settings); payment settings (including credit card information and
promotional certificate and gift card balances); e-mail notification
settings (including Product Availability Alerts, Delivers, and
newsletters); Recommendations (including Recommended for You
and Improve Your Recommendations); shopping lists and gift
registries (including Wish Lists and Baby and Wedding Registries);
Seller accounts; and Your Profile (including your product Reviews,
Recommendations, Listmania lists, Reminders, personal profile, and
Wish List).
Id.
237
See id.
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upon it? The ambiguity and lack of complete transparency
sanctioned by the current data privacy paradigm of “Notice and
Choice” might insulate businesses from legal claims or FTC inquiry,
but they leave consumers and their data vulnerable to misappropriation, mishandling, and misuse.
Amazon’s products and services are uniformly governed by a
blanket privacy policy.238 When a user first creates an Amazon
account to enter its ecosystem, she sees the following notification:
“By creating an account, you agree to Amazon’s Conditions of Use
and Privacy Notice,”239 written in small font beneath the required
log-in fields. The qualification contains a link, which redirects the
user to the referenced Conditions of Use and Privacy Notice. Once
a user clicks “sign in,” no further affirmative action is required to
assent to Amazon’s terms or policies. Such “acceptance by use” is
known legally as a browse-wrap agreement and has become a
standard method by which tech companies comply with “notice.”240
The mere act of creating an Amazon account or using an Alexa
device makes consent to Amazon’s policies less a “choice” and
more a fait accompli.
The means by which a user interfaces with Alexa can further
blur the lines of consent. Unlike manually typing items into a search
bar or mouse clicking a button, an Alexa user simply queries aloud
as though engaged in conversation with an actual person. Alexa’s
natural-language processing erases any tactile reminder that one’s
data is constantly being collected or stored. The convenience and
ease of using the hardware masks the surreptitious and constant
surveillance of its software. As a result, Alexa users may be lulled
into a false sense of security to feel comfortable disclosing to
Amazon more data than necessary to achieve a requested task—all
with little understanding as to how this data fed to Alexa might be
stored or used by Amazon in the future.241
238

See Amazon Privacy Notice, supra note 231.
See Registration, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2X38E2K [https://perma.cc/6DEBNJKX].
240
See Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are
Wrapped Up to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 174 (2007) (defining “browsewrap” as an agreement “typically presented at the bottom of the Web site where acceptance
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See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 141–46.
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While tech companies such as Amazon tout their adherence to
the self-regulatory practice of “privacy by design,”242 the loopholes
deliberately embedded into online interfaces, legal disclaimers, and
AI collection render ineffective the federal government’s outdated
regime of “Notice and Choice” as a means to protect users and their
privacy from predatory data collection practices.243 As Professor
Woodrow Hartzog argues, “Every aspect of the user experience is
designed to extract data out of [the user], to get [the user] to never
stop sharing, and to have [the user] feel good about it in
the process.”244
When the FTC initially embraced “Notice and Choice” as the
cornerstone for consumer data privacy protection, technology was
limited,245 data storage was prohibitively expensive,246 and data
collection through intermediaries was a mere by-product of the service offered rather than the service itself.247 As a result, companies
were more selective in the type of data they would collect and would
maintain only as much information as was necessary for their

242

WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN
(2018).
243
See Sacha Molitorisz, It’s Time for Third-Party Data Brokers to Emerge from the
Shadows, CONVERSATION (Apr. 4, 2018, 2:46 AM), https://theconversation.com/its-timefor-third-party-data-brokers-to-emerge-from-the-shadows-94298 [https://perma.cc/ULH9
-WLJJ].
244
Daniel Solove, Should Privacy Law Regulate Technological Design? An Interview
with Woodrow Hartzog, TEACHPRIVACY (Apr. 12, 2018), https://teachprivacy.com/shouldprivacy-law-regulate-technological-design-an-interview-with-woodrow-hartzog/
[https://perma.cc/6J7C-Z592].
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See Cameron F. Kerry, Proposed Language for Data Collection Standards in Privacy
Legislation, BROOKINGS (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2019/04/16/proposed-language-for-data-collection-standards-in-privacy-legislation/
[https://perma.cc/7BXV-BHQC].
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See Lucas Mearian, CW@50: Data Storage Goes from $1M to 2 Cents per Gigabyte,
COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 23, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.computerworld.com/article/
3182207/cw50-data-storage-goes-from-1m-to-2-cents-per-gigabyte.html
[https://perma.cc/7U6M-HV73] (explaining that in 1967 one gigabyte of hard drive storage
would have cost one million dollars, while today it costs two cents); see also HEW REPORT,
supra note 167, at 22.
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See Steven Melendez & Alex Pasternack, Here Are the Data Brokers Quietly Buying
and Selling Your Personal Information, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 2, 2019), https://www.fast
company.com/90310803/here-are-the-data-brokers-quietly-buying-and-selling-yourpersonal-information [https://perma.cc/4Y5G-4FQ3].
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immediate purposes.248 But times have changed.249 Thanks in large
part to Amazon,250 cloud storage today is cheap and scalable, and
the proliferation of voice-activated AI smart assistants has exponentially increased the scope of data collection.251 The pairing of
Alexa’s voice-activated, always-on surveillance with Amazon’s
unlimited cloud server space allows for unrestricted harvesting,
storage, and manipulation of user data, in which individuals are
often unwittingly consenting to the perpetual and constant collection
of their voice, their image, their likes, their habits, their questions,
and, essentially, their thoughts.252
“Mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that
‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops.’”253 The siphoning of one’s inviolate personality—the
very harm that Warren and Brandeis warned against over one
hundred years ago—is still happening today.254 In 1890 Warren and
Brandeis were focused on addressing two new technological
inventions: the portable recording device and the portable camera.255
Today, these “mechanical devices” have proliferated and invaded
all spheres of our personal space. They exist in our homes, our cars,
our offices, and most ubiquitously, our pockets. Although the

248

See Kerry, supra note 246.
See Scott Fulton III, Amazon AWS: Complete Business Guide to the World’s Largest
Provider of Cloud Services, ZDNET (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon
-aws-everything-you-should-know-about-the-largest-cloud-provider/ [https://perma.cc/
4M3E-PPU7].
250
See id. (“Today, Amazon is the world’s largest provider of computing services
accessible through the web from globally distributed servers in highly automated data
centers.”). In 2018, AWS grew forty-seven percent and accounted for the majority of the
company’s profits that fiscal year. See Stephanie Condon, In 2018 AWS Delivered Most of
Amazon’s Operating Income, ZDNET (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/in2018-aws-delivered-most-of-amazons-operating-income/ [https://perma.cc/AD34-RU9T].
251
See Keith D. Foote, A Brief History of Data Storage, DATAVERSITY (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.dataversity.net/brief-history-data-storage/ [https://perma.cc/EZK8-D9CS].
252
See The Learning Machine: Amazon’s Empire Rests on Its Low-Key Approach to AI,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.economist.com/business/2019/04/13/amazonsempire-rests-on-its-low-key-approach-to-ai [https://perma.cc/T7R3-WW2K] (explaining
that Amazon is one of AWS’ biggest customers); see also HARTZOG, supra note 243, at
248–49.
253
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 195.
254
See id. at 205, 211.
255
See WALDMAN, supra note 9, at 16.
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technology of these “mechanical devices” has advanced exponentially, the injury to the individual—the intrusion into one’s private
space—remains the same. Unfortunately, 130 years later, the law
has failed to evolve to adequately address these concerns.256
B. Amazon Home. Amazon Health. Amazon, Help!: A Cautionary
Tale
A user’s purchase of a voice-enabled Alexa smart assistant
device signifies more than merely the acquisition of a high-end
technical gadget; it represents the “filing [of] citizen papers for the
digital duchy of Amazonia.”257 Amazon wants Alexa and its datacollecting AI to be ubiquitous; Amazon wants to siphon as much
personal data from its users as possible.258 Therefore, when a
consumer opts to buy an Alexa, she makes more than a simple
utilitarian decision based on product functionality; rather, she
chooses to adopt an ecosystem into her life and her home—similar
to adopting a pet—albeit a pet with a doctorate in statistical analysis
and a highly sophisticated algorithm that can track and analyze
every aspect of every interaction.259
Quantitative futurist Amy Webb, founder of the Future Today
Institute, predicts that by 2029 most of the population will live in
smart homes—domiciles designed for a 24/7 concierge experience,
in which a singular AI (such as Amazon’s AI, Alexa) controls,
and the entire house runs on the algorithmic data outputs of its

256

See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Plaintiff alleged
misinformation posted only by the defendant caused harm to his employment prospects,
which in turn caused him increased anxiety and stress.). The Court dismissed the suit for
lack of Article III standing for failure to plead a tangible or “concrete” injury—one that
was “real, and not abstract.” Id. at 1548. This ruling has severely limited the avenues for
redress for many data subjects who have experienced only reputational or “intangible”
harms as a result of the misuse of their data.
257
Steven Levy, Jeff Bezos Owns the Web in More Ways Than You Think, WIRED (Nov.
13, 2011, 9:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/11/ff_bezos/ [https://perma.cc/42AA8AX9].
258
See Steve Wasserman, The Amazon Effect, NATION (May 29, 2012),
https://www.thenation.com/article/amazon-effect/ [https://perma.cc/R9WP-RPG2].
259
See Ken C. Pohlmann, Big Data and You: The Analytics of Amazon’s Alexa, SOUND
& VISION (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.soundandvision.com/content/analytics-alexa
[https://perma.cc/9JL3-TUED] (explaining the technology behind Alexa).
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inhabitants.260 To many, this scenario sounds blissfully idyllic.
After all, few would balk at the convenience and efficiency of
a personalized assistant with the ability to analyze and anticipate
every interaction in order to remain a step ahead of one’s personal
needs at all times. But Webb’s vision paints a more cautionary
tale.261 A smart home, in which every gadget is Alexa-enabled,
would provide literal 24/7 surveillance of its inhabitants, which
translates to 24/7 collection of their data, steadily streamed to digital
dossiers, stored in perpetuity on Amazon’s cloud servers.262 This
around-the-clock perpetual surveillance would allow Amazon
to peek behind the curtain and gain access to a more comprehensive
representation of the consumer and her family.263 Although
singularly some of the raw data collected may appear harmless
or even trivial, when synthesized in the aggregate, such seemingly
innocuous data can lead to harmful and unintended consequences—
especially when that data is coupled with other pieces of collected
information, analyzed, and re-purposed to predict or affect
future situations.264
Amazon may have begun as a simple online bookseller,265 but it
has grown into a multi-hyphenate conglomerate with tentacles in a

260

See Schwab, supra note 7 (describing Amy Webb’s vision for the future); see also
Welcome to Your Connected Home, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/b?node
=13295231011 [https://perma.cc/J3S8-LYBB]; Jared Newman, With Cheap New Smart
Home Gear, Amazon Wants to Keep You in Its World, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 6, 2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90241614/with-cheap-new-smart-home-gear-amazonwants-to-keep-you-in-its-world [https://perma.cc/C33G-CG6X].
261
See id.
262
See id.
263
See id.
264
See id. (describing how Amazon may from ambient noise be able to detect who else
is in the room and even discern from a voice whether one is sick or depressed); see also
Louise Matsakis, The Wired Guide to Your Personal Data (And Who Is Using It), WIRED
(Feb. 15, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-personal-datacollection/ [https://perma.cc/S6AK-JCC6] (“Even seemingly benign activities, like staying
in and watching a movie, generate mountains of information, treasure to be scooped up
later by businesses of all kinds.”).
265
See Avery Hartmans, 15 Fascinating Facts You Probably Didn’t Know About
Amazon, BUS. INSIDER (June 17, 2019, 2:47 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jeffbezos-amazon-history-facts-2017-4; see also Amazon Studios, AMAZON, https://studios.
amazon.com/ [https://perma.cc/Q93Q-3BDC].
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myriad of retail markets ranging from entertainment266 to grocery267
to cloud computing.268 While on the surface Amazon’s expansion
into various marketplaces may look like mere portfolio diversification, a deeper analysis reveals that each extension of its realm
provides the company increased opportunities to collect consumer
data.269 To date, much of Amazon’s collected data has been
employed to better predict, streamline, and facilitate users’ transactions and purchases on its retail site.270 However, it begs the
question, what might happen to the copious amounts of user data
that Amazon has already collected should the company branch out
into other non-retail sectors, such as healthcare?
In January 2018, Amazon announced a joint partnership with JP
Morgan Chase and Berkshire Hathaway, signaling its entrée into the
data-driven healthcare sector.271 In November 2018, Amazon
launched Amazon Comprehend Medical, “a new HIPAA-eligible
machine learning service that allows developers to process
unstructured medical text and identify information such as patient
diagnosis, treatments, dosages, symptoms and signs.”272 In April
266
See Saquib Shah, Amazon Will Become a Bona Fide Film Studio This Year,
ENGADGET (July 31, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/07/31/amazon-film-studio/
[https://perma.cc/S5BZ-KJRQ]; see also Amazon Studios, supra note 266.
267
See Nick Wingfield & Michael J. de la Merced, Amazon to Buy Whole Foods for $13.4
Billion, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/business/
dealbook/amazon-whole-foods.html [https://perma.cc/E8AP-2E3L].
268
See Cloud Computing with AWS, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/what-is-aws/
[https://perma.cc/Z93L-AJJK].
269
See Greg Petro, Amazon’s Acquisition of Whole Foods Is About Two Things: Data
and Product, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2017, 12:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregpetro/
2017/08/02/amazons-acquisition-of-whole-foods-is-about-two-things-data-and-product/
#3ada9d4ba808 [https://perma.cc/2EKS-Z5VB]; see also Mike Sands, How Amazon Is
Minting a New Generation of Customer-Data-Obsessed Companies, FORBES (Mar. 2,
2018, 10:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikesands1/2018/03/02/how-amazon-isminting-a-new-generation-of-customer-data-obsessed-companies/#19fa09d28ed7
[https://perma.cc/7T7K-EW42].
270
See The Learning Machine, supra note 252; see also Sands, supra note 269.
271
See Nick Wingfield et al., Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway and JPMorgan Team Up to
Try to Disrupt Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
01/30/technology/amazon-berkshire-hathaway-jpmorgan-health-care.html
[https://perma.cc/7KM4-LEC2].
272
Andis Robeznieks, Amazon’s Health Care Push Expands to Machine Learning for the
EHR, AMA (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/digital/
amazon-s-health-care-push-expands-machine-learning-ehr
[https://perma.cc/2JDTU38K].
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2019, Amazon announced the release of its first set of HIPAAcompliant Alexa skills.273 Although “Prime Health” has yet to
materialize, it remains only a matter of time before that occurs,
according to investor John Doerr.274 Once that happens, Amazon’s
vault of collected user data and its ability to effectively manipulate
that data with its algorithms will give the company an edge
in a sector that has been notoriously reluctant to embrace
new technology.275
The kind of lifestyle and biometric data that Alexa’s AI can now
collect from its vantage within the home will have tremendous worth
when it is (inevitably) applied in the context of healthcare, predicts
Webb.276 Consider the following hypothetical scenario: In an Alexaenabled smart home, User X wakes every morning at 8:30 and tasks
Alexa with calling an Uber to take him to work. User X comes
home every evening around 6:30, plops himself on the couch, and
watches five hours of peak television courtesy of Amazon Prime. At
approximately 11:30 each night, User X yells from his couch for
Alexa to order him a large pizza with all of the preferred toppings
and a two-liter bottle of soda. User X is a creature of habit, so this
routine repeats daily. Amazon collects all of this information—the
wake-up time and, relatedly, how much time has been spent asleep,
the destinations of the Uber rides, the types of television programs
watched, the amount of pizza and soda consumed—all under the
273

See Natalie Gagliordi, Amazon Launches HIPAA-Compliant Alexa Skills for
Healthcare, ZDNET (Apr. 4, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazonlaunches-hipaa-compliant-alexa-skills-for-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/5Q5W-225T].
274
See Mark Sullivan, Amazon Prime Health Is Coming, According to an Early Investor,
FAST COMPANY (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90274630/amazonprime-health-is-coming-according-to-an-early-investor [https://perma.cc/S5B9-MAE6].
275
See id.
276
See Schwab, supra note 7; see also Molly Wood, Amazon Is 25 Years Old. What Will
the Company’s Next Chapter Look Like?, MARKETPLACE (July 2, 2019),
https://www.marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/amazon-is-25-years-old-what-willcompanys-next-chapter-look-like/ [https://perma.cc/6NSB-BY3F] (“Once the boxes and
the things that we’ve ordered arrived at our homes, the data pipeline gets shut off. If you’re
suddenly now talking to all the different devices in your home (speakers, microwaves,
refrigerators, medicine cabinets), that data pipeline gets turned back on. That’s important
because it opens new possibilities for data collection, all kinds of additional biometric data,
like what’s their emotional state? Has the cadence of their voice changed? Are they manic
or are they depressed? We’re talking about a significant ecosystem, which in many ways
is making our lives easier, but the ways in which that’s happening is invisible to us.”).
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guise of providing convenience to the consumer. In addition to the
basic information that is willingly given to Alexa, Amazon also
acquires and analyzes recordings of how User X’s voice and attitude
changed daily in his Interactions. Was he happy, sad, annoyed,
calm, or agitated? Now, consider what might happen if User X, an
Amazon Prime subscriber, were to attempt to purchase health
insurance coverage through Amazon and its “Prime Health”
Initiative. Although on his application he might paint himself as an
average male living a relatively healthy lifestyle, what is to stop
Amazon from employing the information it has already collected
on him to determine that his lifestyle and diet put him in a risk
category such that his Prime Health insurance premiums would
be higher than the average individual or that he might be denied
coverage altogether? Under current U.S. data privacy regulations,
the unfortunate answer is: absolutely nothing.
Why should consumers care about what happens to their data
once it is disclosed to a collector like Amazon? What is the harm?
After all, the more that Amazon or a data collector knows about a
user, the better the quality of customized, tailored concierge service
it can provide. Admittedly, it is difficult to care when the true
potential for harm remains unknown; however, this is precisely
when the law must step in and proactively protect consumers. Under
the current regulatory regime, users and even the data collectors
themselves do not always know who is on the receiving end of the
information collected or how that information might ultimately be
used.277 As Professor Louis Menand presciently articulated, “[T]he
danger of data collection by online companies is not that they will
use it to try to sell you stuff. The danger is that that information can
so easily fall into the hands of parties whose motives are much less
benign.”278 Would users so readily offer personal information if
they understood that government agencies like the Drug Enforcement Administration, Internal Revenue Service, and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection regularly request, collect, and store
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See Louis Menand, Why Do We Care so Much About Privacy?, NEW YORKER (June
11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/why-do-we-care-so-muchabout-privacy [https://perma.cc/3V6U-5GCS].
278
Id.

310

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:261

information gathered from data collectors?279 How violated did
users feel when their information was unknowingly siphoned by
Cambridge Analytica prior to the 2016 election?280 Absent a
comprehensive regulatory regime that prioritizes and safeguards
personal data privacy interests, Big Tech and Big Data companies
will remain free to exploit the trust and, moreover, the liberty of the
average consumer.281
C. The Power of Purpose Limitation and Data Minimization
The health insurance hypothetical outlined in Section II.B.
above presents a realistic and not-too-distant-future example of how
seemingly harmless bits of data collected through Alexa’s AI for one
purpose might be stored, re-analyzed and re-deployed by Amazon
for a completely different purpose, and how such “intangible harms”
might harm the consumer.282 While Amazon has yet to achieve total
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See Alan Henry, Why You Should Care About and Defend Your Privacy, LIFEHACKER
(Apr. 25, 2012, 11:00 AM), https://lifehacker.com/why-you-should-care-about-anddefend-your-privacy-5904966 [https://perma.cc/2DRR-GAME]; see also Saira Hussain &
Sophia Cope, DEEP DIVE: CBP’s Social Media Surveillance Poses Risks to Free Speech
and Privacy Rights, EFF (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/deepdive-cbps-social-media-surveillance-poses-risks-free-speech-and-privacy
[https://perma.cc/PJL8-TL53].
280
See Kurt Wagner, Here’s How Facebook Allowed Cambridge Analytica to Get Data
for 50 Million Users, VOX (Mar. 17, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/3/17/
17134072/facebook-cambridge-analytica-trump-explained-user-data
[https://perma.cc/
T2RY-3GBK]; see also Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50
Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/
cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election
[https://perma.cc/2BYG-M9Y7];
Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of
Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/
cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/39XT-B6VD].
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See Menand, supra note 278 (arguing that “privacy” is not what consumers are really
worried about, but that the real issue is a curtailment of liberty or the freedom to choose).
282
For a more positive spin on an example, consultants Debbie Hoffman and Maureen
Hydox suggest that:
Amazon can leverage consumer purchasing data with health
information to create a holistic picture of health . . . . Amazon’s cloud
platform . . . along with their artificial intelligence capabilities could
provide physicians with recommendations based on information in the
electronic health record (EHR) as well as the consumer’s lifestyle
based on purchasing patterns and information captured by smart home
technologies. These data-based recommendations could identify a
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omniscience through an Alexa-controlled data-fueled ecosystem,
the repurposing of collected user data is likely already occurring.283
As Jeff Bezos readily admits, “We never throw away data.”284
Unfortunately, existing U.S. data privacy laws do little to provide consumers protection from such data repurposing. Amazon’s
privacy policy contains a section that explains how and with whom
the company shares user data.285 “Subsidiaries of Amazon” are
among the recipient list.286 As such, the consumer, upon creation of
her Amazon account, grants Amazon the right to collect her data and
consents to its dissemination among Amazon’s various divisions
and subsidiaries.287 As the current U.S. privacy regime treats
consumer data as an asset of the company that collects it rather than
of the individual who discloses it, the law would view a user’s
disclosure to Alexa as voluntary and Amazon’s subsequent reuse
within its own ecosystem as perfectly legal.288
So, the question remains, how should the U.S. legal paradigm
shift to better protect the privacy rights of the data subject and ensure
that data collected will not harm the subject? One answer lies in
the embrace and implementation of two oft-forgotten privacy
principles: purpose limitation and data minimization.289 Although
these doctrines have existed as part of the FIPPs since 1973, have
condition and recommend a treatment based on a more holistic look at
the consumer’s lifestyle, not just their ailment.
Debbie Hoffman & Maureen Hydok, If Amazon Created a Health System, HURON (2018),
https://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/resources/healthcare/amazon-created-healthsystem [https://perma.cc/W7XZ-MWAC].
283
See Bernard Marr, Why Data Minimization Is an Important Concept in the Age of Big
Data, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2016, 3:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/
03/16/why-data-minimization-is-an-important-concept-in-the-age-of-big-data/#150d7261
da45 [https://perma.cc/73B9-GPVR].
284
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See Amazon Privacy Notice, supra note 231.
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See id.
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See id.
288
See Naughton, supra note 110 (quoting Zuboff’s assertion that most data collected
becomes “proprietary behavioural surplus”).
289
OECD, THE OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 2 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/
sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K6K-P5C2] [hereinafter
OECD FRAMEWORK] (“Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development is a
unique forum where governments work together to address the economic, social and
environmental challenges of globalisation.”).
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been embraced by the OECD,290 and have served as the driving
forces behind the EU’s privacy policies, they have been largely
ignored as regulating forces within the United States.291
The purpose limitation principle contains two distinct elements:
(1) data must only be collected for purposes that are specified (prior
to collection), explicit and legitimate; and (2) such data must not
be further processed in a way that is incompatible with those
purposes.292 In the event that an entity wishes to employ collected
data for a purpose other than that for which it was originally
collected, affirmative consent from the user would be required.
Purpose limitation returns a degree of control to the user and
holds data collectors accountable. It helps to ensure that one’s
personal data, collected with consent for one purpose (e.g., to affect
a financial transaction such as ordering a pizza), would not be
indefinitely stored and indiscriminately reused for a different
or non-compatible purpose (e.g., to determine eligibility for
healthcare coverage).
Data minimization requires that the amount of information
collected, used, accessed, or stored be only the minimum necessary
to achieve the specified purpose.293 In practice this means that data
collectors must limit the collection, storage, and usage of personal
data to only that which is relevant, adequate, and essential to
accomplish the stated purpose for which the data has been initially
processed. According to advocates of the principle, adherence
to data minimization not only protects a data subject’s privacy
interests, but also increases efficiency and reduces risk to the data
collector.294 The less unnecessary data that a company keeps on
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See Marr, supra note 284 (quoting Jeff Bezos: “We never throw away data.”). But see
Jedidiah Bracy, Apple’s New Privacy Push Focuses on Data Minimization, IAPP (June 9,
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See OECD FRAMEWORK, supra note 290, at 14; see also GDPR, supra note 141, art.
5(1)(b), at 35.
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See GDPR, supra note 141, art. 5(1)(c), at 35.
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TEACHPRIVACY, https://teachprivacy.com/data-minimization-the-inquisitive-interrogator/
[https://perma.cc/9LC5-Z6L5].
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hand, the easier and faster it is to locate and employ relevant data.295
The deletion of data that no longer serves its purpose further limits
a company’s exposure to breach.296 Data minimization, therefore,
limits the volume of personal information stored by data collectors
and further ensures that such personal data cannot be collected,
stored, or accessed in perpetuity without affirmative consent from
the user.297
The two FIPPs principles of purpose limitation and data
minimization work in tandem to guarantee that data disclosed by
users and collected by brokers remain accurate, relevant, and
protected. By embracing these principles alongside those of notice
and choice, and implementing them through comprehensive federal
data privacy legislation, the current legal paradigm in the United
States would shift from one focused on protecting the desires of the
tech sector towards one more focused on protecting the information
and privacy of the consumer.
D. Proposed Legislative Solutions
The failure of the United States to implement comprehensive
federal data privacy reform has created a privacy vortex in which
data brokers dominate—dictating a “collect now, decide later”
approach to collection—and consumers remain exposed prey to the
predatory practices of the tech sector. The current privacy paradigm
asymmetrically favors the private tech sector, sanctions dragnet
surveillance and leaves data subjects susceptible to financial,
emotional, and reputational harm.

295
296
297

See id.
See id.
See Marr, supra note 284.
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1. The States
Despite the recent escalation of hacks,298 breaches,299 and
egregious exploitation of consumer data by tech companies
themselves,300 the United States still refuses to adopt a more
stringent and comprehensive federal data privacy policy. As threats
to consumer data privacy increase, the need for comprehensive
federal legislation to address these issues intensifies. Unwilling
to wait for Congress, and recognizing a need for immediate action,
the state legislatures in California, Vermont, and Illinois have taken
action to protect their constituents’ data privacy.301 Other states,
such as Hawaii, Massachusetts, and New York, have followed the
earlier states’ lead and thus have similar consumer data privacy
legislation pending.302
a) California
Unlike the Federal Constitution, California’s State Constitution
grants its citizens a right of privacy.303 In keeping with that right, the
state had previously enacted privacy legislation that mandates
disclosure to users when their data has been breached304 and
demands the provision of clear and conspicuous privacy policies for
any business online that collects a California citizen’s personal
data.305 In June 2018, California’s state legislature passed the
California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), a sweeping privacy
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See, e.g., Joseph Cox, Hacker Breaches Securus, the Company That Helps Cops Track
Phones Across the US, MOTHERBOARD (May 16, 2018, 1:16 PM), https://motherboard.
vice.com/en_us/article/gykgv9/securus-phone-tracking-company-hacked
[https://perma.cc/YTQ8-SQKM].
299
See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, The Wired Guide to Data Breaches, WIRED (Dec. 7,
2018,
9:00
AM)
https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-to-data-breaches/
[https://perma.cc/CTD7-K8RX].
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See, e.g., Matthew Rosenberg & Sheera Frankel, Facebook’s Role in Data Misuse
Sets Off Storms on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/03/18/us/cambridge-analytica-facebook-privacy-data.html [https://perma.cc/
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See infra notes 304–22 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 323–36 and accompanying text.
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CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29(a), 1798.82(a) (West 2019).
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California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–
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reform bill that in many ways mirrors the EU’s GDPR.306 The CCPA
protects California citizens by embracing the principles of purpose
limitation and data minimization, increasing the transparency of
data collectors’ policies, and providing the consumer with a “right
to be forgotten.”307 While the California law enacts substantial
protections, its applications reach only as far as California residents.308 As the law does not take effect until 2020,309 it remains to
be seen what, if any, impact such regulation will have on businesses’
treatment of consumers in the remaining forty-nine states.
b) Vermont
In May of 2018, Vermont passed Act 171, which aims to
regulate and hold third party data brokers accountable for the sale
and misuse of consumers’ personal data.310 The legislation, which
took effect January 1, 2019, aims to return some degree of control
back to the consumer by attempting to thwart the all-too-common,
yet rarely-discussed, practice of shadow profiling—the wholesale
collection and subsequent resale of consumer data aggregated from
thousands of data points garnered from multiple sources (e.g.,
browsing history, online purchases, public records, location data311)
by entities who lack a direct relationship with the consumer.312
Vermont’s legislation compels all third-party data brokers operating
in Vermont to be registered with the state,313 mandates disclosure of
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collected information pertaining to one’s credit scores or report,314
requires that security protocols be in place to protect the collected
data,315 and imposes steep penalties for violations.316 While the
Vermont law is the first to hold accountable third-party data brokers,
it fails to address or hold accountable first-party data brokers (like
Amazon).317 Therefore, businesses that (a) collect data in the natural
course of trade, (b) have a direct relationship with the consumer,
such as websites, apps, or e-commerce platforms, and (c) do not
resell data to third parties are not subject to the law. The law also
fails to require consumer consent to the collection or subsequent sale
of the data. If the aim of the law is transparency, then affirmative
consumer consent—not simply an “opt-out” provision—should
be required.
c) Illinois
Although specifically engineered to protect the collection of
biometric data (e.g., facial/retina scan, fingerprint, DNA), Illinois’
Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”)318 safeguards the
consumer by incorporating the principles of purpose limitation and
data minimization.319 Additionally, BIPA authorizes a private right
of action to allow individual consumers to directly sue infringing
companies.320 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the courts have
interpreted BIPA as a strict liability statute.321 This means that mere
violation of the law is enough to establish a concrete injury that can
provide plaintiffs with standing; no other “tangible” harm need be
shown to bring a cause of action.322
314
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316
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See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 Ill. LEXIS 7, at **17 (Ill. Sup. Ct.
2019).
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d) Pending State Legislation
Inspired by California’s swift passage of CCPA, the state
legislatures of Hawaii,323 Maryland,324 Massachusetts,325
Mississippi,326 Nevada,327 North Dakota,328 New Mexico,329 New
York,330 Rhode Island, 331 and Washington332 introduced similar
comprehensive, omnibus, GDPR-influenced, consumer data privacy
legislation at the beginning of 2019. New York also introduced a bill
similar to BIPA focused on biometric privacy.333 The latter half of
2019 saw Mississippi’s bill die in committee, New Mexico’s bill
effectively die with an “action postponed indefinitely” status,334 and
North Dakota’s bill reduced to a proposal for a legislative management study.335 In May 2019, Nevada passed S.B. 220, which
amended its current notification law to allow for users to opt out of
the sale of their information to third parties. The bill further provides
a private right of action for any person injured by a violation of
the new right to opt out or the existing obligations to provide
notice.336 The remaining six state bills are pending in various stages
of discussion within their respective committees.
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Plaintiffs in data privacy and data breach litigation cases have often struggled with the issue
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e) State Data Breach Notification Statutes
In addition to the pending data privacy statutes mentioned
above, all fifty states have also enacted some version of a data
breach notification statute, which imposes data protection standards
on companies that collect personal information and mandates
disclosure protocols when a data breach occurs.337 While these
statutes help inform consumers when their data has been breached,
hacked, or stolen, they unfortunately do little to address the way data
is collected, to prevent misuse of the collected data, or even to
provide courses of action to remedy affected consumers.
2. The Federal Government
In 2015, President Obama proposed a federal privacy bill—the
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act—that aimed to give consumers
more control over their data and attempted to establish a baseline for
the way businesses should treat the collection, storage, and use of
consumer data.338 Although the proposed bill adopted many of the
FIPPs—transparency, notice, choice, purpose limitation, and data
minimization339—it received criticism from privacy advocacy
groups as well as the tech sector.340 The former argued the proposal
did not go far enough to protect consumers, while the latter
contended such federal regulation was confusing and would stifle
innovation.341 Unfortunately, the plan never gained enough traction
in Congress to become law.
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More recently, however, several Senators, including Brian
Schatz (D-HI), Mark Warner (D-VA) and Edward Markey (D-MA),
have drafted federal data privacy proposals for Senate consideration.
Senator Schatz’s Data Care Act of 2018 borrows from Jack Balkin’s
theories and aims to establish a fiduciary relationship between data
brokers and data subjects.342 His bill would impose fiduciary duties
of care, loyalty, and confidentiality onto data brokers to ensure that
collected data could not be used in a manner that would bring
harm to the data subject. Senator Warner’s DETOUR Act also
embraces the idea of imposing fiduciary duties upon data collectors,
but focuses more on regulating predatory design elements such
as the user interface and the algorithmic equations that siphon
data.343 Warner’s bill recommends heightening the standard of
transparency for algorithms that govern data collection, expanding
and empowering the FTC to become the official privacy regulator,
and adopting GDPR-like structures to protect data subjects.344
Senator Markey’s Privacy Bill of Rights Act eschews the
problematic information fiduciary construct345 and instead proposes
a return to the FIPPs and the empowerment of the individual user.346
In doing so, however, Markey’s bill suggests a loose framework—
including the principles of purpose limitation and data minimization
as well as affirmative “opt-in” consent—but does not actually pass
any regulation at all. Instead, it shifts the onus for such regulation to
the FTC to promulgate rules that comport with the ideals set forth
in his legislation.347
To date, each of the federal legislative proposals has been
introduced or is currently under consideration in its respective
committee.348 However, none has garnered the bipartisan or tech
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sector support necessary to achieve passage. Moreover, while each
proposal contains a noteworthy or important element that attacks a
particular issue of data privacy or data protection, no singular piece
of legislation has presented the kind of comprehensive, omnibus
reform necessary to address the rising threats posed by the rapid
advancement of data collection technology via AI.
IV. MOVING FORWARD: A HYBRID PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE
Today, the technology of AI, the internet, and the IoT transcends
the previous constraints of physical or geographic boundaries. Big
Data collectors such as Amazon now operate in an interconnected
global economy where data functions as the prime currency.349 The
current threats posed to consumer data privacy by unregulated
tech entities cannot be mitigated by a disparate patchwork of
localized, state, or sectoral solutions. The only way to effectively
and efficiently curtail these privacy risks is to pass comprehensive,
federal consumer data privacy legislation that will impose
restrictions on the collection of personal data regardless of the sector
or entity collecting, establish baselines for acceptable collection
practices, outline prohibitions for the collection, storage, and usage
of personal data, and uniformly enforce penalties for violations
across all fifty states.
Given the pace at which data collection technology continues to
advance and the exponential growth of the tech sector’s thirst to
exploit such collected data, the current self-regulatory regime can
no longer be sustained. The government must intervene. However,
for federal legislation to be effective and efficient in regulating
entities and protecting the consumer from predatory data collection,
retention, and use, it must address several key elements.
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(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-mostvaluable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/QWB9-48JT].
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A. A Return to the FIPPs and the Establishment of a Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights
One of the main focuses for new federal legislation must be to
allow consumers to reclaim and retain control of their data. Due to
the failure of “Notice and Choice,” consumers have only the illusion
of control; however, once they consent to engage with a company,
any control over their data subsequently resides in the hands of the
data collectors and not the data subjects.350 To empower and protect
the consumer, therefore, federal legislation must shift the privacy
paradigm away from dependence solely on “Notice and Choice” and
towards a regime that adopts all of the FIPPs, including the key
principles of purpose limitation and data minimization,351 as
outlined by the OECD352 rather than the FTC.
The full array of FIPPs—including purpose limitation and data
minimization—must be incorporated and codified into a federal
Consumer Bill of Rights, which would comprehensively outline the
freedoms bestowed upon and powers granted to the consumer across
all fifty states. Borrowing aspects from the GDPR353 and Obama’s
original 2012 privacy proposal,354 the Bill of Rights should establish
a baseline for consumer data protection and demand that data
collectors provide users with the transparency necessary to identify,
access, interrogate, correct and delete all collected information. All
such rights should be applied not only proactively but also
retroactively, so that data collected prior to legislation would be
subject to the same restrictions and regulations.
B. A Dedicated Privacy Regulatory Body
Congress has never delegated privacy oversight to any regulatory body; therefore, new federal legislation must rectify this
previous omission. Since the FTC has become the de facto privacy
350
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regulator,355 it seems most efficient to keep oversight under their
auspices. However, in doing so, it is further imperative to create a
dedicated data privacy division within the larger federal agency that
is adequately staffed, funded, and endowed with the full range of
regulatory tools necessary to effectively and efficiently enforce the
more-robust data privacy laws that this Note envisions. This means
that full rulemaking authority under Section 553 would need to be
restored for privacy oversight; thus, the restrictive amendments of
Moss–Magnuson and the FTC Improvement Act should be repealed
for data privacy regulations. Additionally, any FTC-led regulatory
body would need to have the ability to prosecute all federal data
privacy violations as well as any violations of Section 5 of the
FTC Act.
C. Civil Right of Action
Much of the legislation that has been proposed at the state and
federal level focuses on government-based action against private
sector statutory violations. However, a crucial element that should
be included in any future data privacy legislation is a civil right of
action, which may be triggered by a mere violation of a statutory
provision.356 The creation of a strict liability regime for data privacy
violations would allow victims of predatory data practices a means
by which to seek judicial redress. Without it, consumers who have
suffered at the hands of Big Data and Big Tech would likely not be
able to bring tech companies to court.357 The inclusion of a strict
liability civil right of action would allow consumers to demonstrate
a concrete harm and would eliminate the issues of standing that have
previously crippled plaintiffs who have attempted to bring civil suits
against companies for data breaches.358 To make recovery easier for
the consumer and to limit the litigation costs for violative data
collectors, a civil right of action provision could also include tiered
statutory damages depending on the magnitude of the breach.
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See supra Section II.D.
See, e.g., Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2005).
See discussion supra note 323.
For a more detailed explanation of this issue, see supra note 257.
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D. State Law Preemption
Comprehensive federal privacy legislation must also address the
contentious issue of state law preemption. Since the passage of the
CCPA, California representatives Jackie Spier and Ro Khanna have
been vocal in their opposition to the potential preemption of their
state’s comprehensive privacy law by federal legislation.359 They
remain concerned that federal legislation will create a less stringent
framework for consumer privacy protection. If Congress adequately
addresses the issues currently plaguing consumers—issues that have
already been addressed by several state bills360—then preemption
should become a non-issue. However, if Congress punts and passes
a bill that fails to solve the holistic problem identified by this Note,
then states will rightfully see a need to step in to more fully protect
their constituents. Therefore, to avoid these issues, a federal bill
should use the structure and thresholds established by the CCPA (or
other comprehensive state laws) as a baseline or “floor” for any
legislation. If the aim is to create a uniform set of rules for the tech
sector to follow across all fifty states, the federal bill should be no
less stringent or exacting than any current state bill. However, in the
event that the federal bill passes with less exacting measures than
current state laws, states must be permitted to enact stricter legislation to fill the gaps.
E. The Promotion of Innovation
Finally, although comprehensive data privacy reform should
primarily focus on the protection of the consumer from predatory
practices, it is crucial that any legislation in this area maintains
ample space to allow the tech sector to continue to innovate, expand,
and foster competition. Although the era of self-regulation must
come to an end, any regulatory regime will have far more success
working with the entities regulated rather than working
against them.
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CONCLUSION
As the manipulation of Big Data continues to produce big
profits, the threats to consumer data privacy continue to escalate.
Today, thanks to Amazon’s ubiquitous Alexa and other smart
assistants, the data collection capabilities of AI have infiltrated
the most personal spheres of its users such as the home. It is only a
matter of time before AI dominates other traditionally “protected”
spaces such as our cars,361 our businesses,362 and our classrooms.363
Although the innovations of the tech sector need not be stifled
simply because consumers desire data privacy protection, the tech
sector can no longer be permitted to run roughshod over consumers’
rights under the guise of progress. The United States’ patchwork
sectoral regime of the past must give way to comprehensive reform
for the future. Congress can and should work to implement comprehensive protections to consumer data privacy that will increase
transparency, minimize predatory collection, storage and use
practices, and empower the individual consumer over the tech
industry. The clocks cannot be turned back, nor can data already
collected necessarily be returned. However, by passing comprehensive legislation that will institute a uniform system of federally
mandated rules and regulations, the government can begin to protect
the autonomy, reputation and financial security of the consumer and
safeguard the personal data privacy rights of the individual.
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